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Executive summary 
Although billions of dollars have been spent on improving governance in the past decade, 
few of the programmes that have received funding have been subjected to strong and rig-
orous impact evaluation. Consequently, our understanding of the progress made by do-
nors/governments in this field remains limited. This paper is designed as a working guide 
for practitioners who would like to conduct scientifically credible impact evaluations of 
donor-assisted and government-sponsored governance programmes. It advocates that poli-
cymakers pursue an “evidence-based” development policy in the decision-making on the 
important dimensions of governance.  
Impact evaluation of governance programmes 
The ultimate goal of impact evaluation is to understand the extent to which observed out-
comes can be attributed to the programme, and to the programme alone. The term “rigor-
ous” impact evaluation has grown in popularity over the past few years. It implies tackling 
the attribution problem through the use of experimental and quasi-experimental techniques 
in evaluation. Many economic and social sectors have been evaluated using these tech-
niques: labour, health, nutrition, water, infrastructure, agriculture and education. Unlike 
these sectors, governance has been subjected to relatively little rigorous evaluation, some 
of the likely reasons being that:  
• governance is characterised by complex interventions routinely combining various 
activities and producing outcomes that are difficult to measure;  
• not many rigorous evaluators have focused on this field;  
• insignificant and negative results are not published (publication bias);  
• the topic is politically sensitive; and  
• reliable baseline and longitudinal data are scarce.  
There is considerable scope for evaluating certain types of governance interventions rigor-
ously, perhaps far more than one would initially think. Admittedly, the applicability of 
quantitative techniques is subject to some limitations, but the interventions can be broken 
down into components suitable for this kind of analysis.  
Which aspects of governance have been analysed using quantitative evaluation 
techniques? 
Some aspects of governance programmes have been subjected to rigorous impact evalua-
tion. Experimental design, and specifically randomised control trial have been frequently 
applied in evaluating programmes concerning corruption, elections and community devel-
opment. Quasi-experimental designs – difference-in-differences, instrumental variables, 
propensity score matching and regression discontinuity designs – have also been used to 
assess issues related to government spending, local capture, voting behaviour, crime, citi-
zen participation and transparency. A broader message conveyed by these examples is that 
experimental and quasi-experimental designs can be applied to evaluate difficult concepts, 
with the focus less on the success (or failure) of the intervention itself. While several do-
nors have stepped up their efforts to evaluate governance, there is still significant room for 
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rigorous impact evaluations, seeing that the number of evaluation studies that provide sci-
entific evidence of impact is still small. Thus proof of the effectiveness of certain reforms 
and interventions remains weak, since they have not been replicated or evaluated under 
different conditions.  
Why are governance programmes difficult to evaluate? What can be done about this? 
Impact evaluation of governance programmes shares many of the challenges and data con-
straints facing other development programmes. In practice, the situation with which one is 
confronted is usually less ideal than that conveyed in theory. Some of the difficult points 
and issues encountered in the evaluation of governance programmes are outcome meas-
urement, small sample size, presence of spillovers, lack of baseline data, evaluation at 
higher levels of government, complex interventions and full-coverage programmes.  
Rigorous impact evaluations that have addressed these problems in the context of govern-
ance remain scarce. Alternative approaches to resolving these issues in which experience 
in other sectors is borrowed could therefore prove useful. For instance, outcomes which 
are difficult to measure, such as corruption, can be captured using perception surveys or 
some form of direct measurement. Single differences using propensity score matching or 
triple-difference methods, as well as baseline reconstruction, are options for compensating 
for the lack of baseline data. Spillovers can be potentially managed by changing the level 
of randomisation. Higher levels of government can be evaluated using cluster randomisa-
tion. Complex governance interventions can be investigated by unpacking the intervention 
into smaller dimensions and using randomised factorial design to analyse combinations of 
interventions. Programmes covering the entire population can be rolled out in stages to 
enable impacts to be measured. If that is not possible, treatment can be administered ran-
domly with varying intensity. In the case of full programme roll-out and uniform treat-
ment, time-series with repeated measures taken periodically can be used.  
What practical lessons can we draw from previous experience? 
The debate on the application of rigorous impact evaluation and the challenges it poses has 
implications for the design and implementation of governance interventions. The exam-
ples and challenges highlighted call for the discussion of several aspects:  
Include the evaluator at the outset. The presence of an evaluator in the early phases of 
programme design can significantly increase the potential of rigorous impact evaluation 
(RIE). For practitioners, this means obtaining advice from technically skilled evaluators 
from the very start of the programme. However, including evaluators at the outset is easier 
said than done. As most evaluators are consultants hired externally by donor agencies, 
keeping them on for the entire duration of the programme is not economical. An alterna-
tive approach is to include the evaluator as a member of an advisory committee before 
project implementation, so that appropriate outcome measure and data collected have a 
better chance of remaining valid until the evaluation has been completed.  
Randomise whenever possible. One of the most equitable ways of allocating interven-
tions is through randomisation. Critics would say this is “unethical” since it results in 
benefits being deliberately withheld from those in greatest need. Nevertheless, if random 
allocation of interventions is done properly, it offers the simplest way of evaluating a pro-
gramme.  
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Collect good-quality baseline data. There is a difference between collecting baseline 
data and quality baseline data. Quality baseline data come from careful planning of the 
programme. This is typically difficult to plan ex ante as some indirect outcomes are re-
vealed only during or after implementation.  
Collect data for the control groups. Funding the intervention does not necessarily in-
clude the funding of the collection of control group data. There are cases where funding 
for control group surveys is not included in the programme. As the control group is a very 
important source of information in impact evaluation, it is important to provide a budget 
for this aspect.  
Cooperate with the relevant government agencies. The involvement of government 
agencies in development programmes varies widely. Regardless of the depth of their in-
volvement, the cooperation of the relevant agency must be ensured. Government agencies 
are often important sources of information on the nature of the target beneficiaries. Being 
the local experts, they can help to identify the likelihood of programme take-up. 
Identify components of the programme that permit RIE. It is important to identify 
from the outset potential components of the programme that permit quantitative analysis. 
Depending on the context, the inputs can be matched and combined in different ways to 
shed more light on their marginal contribution.  
Next steps 
As the next items on the research agenda, this paper suggests, firstly, a comprehensive 
scoping study of governance interventions that have been evaluated rigorously to identify 
evidence gaps which an evaluation might seek to close and, secondly, a systematic evalua-
tion of a specific governance intervention to build on existing knowledge of ‘what works’, 
‘what doesn’t’ and ‘why’. A few isolated evaluations are not enough to send a strong mes-
sage on the usefulness of certain interventions. The effectiveness of interventions should 
therefore be tested under various conditions and in various settings. 
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1 Introduction 
A nation’s quest to alleviate poverty hinges crucially on its commitment to ‘good’ govern-
ance. Corruption, political instability, financial mismanagement, conflict, malfunctioning 
legal systems and human rights violations are extremely destructive and have the potential 
to cripple a country’s socio-economic capacity and development. Consequently, ‘good 
governance’ has become a core theme of development policy over the years. The interna-
tional donor community has responded to what it perceives as a lack of good governance 
by investing billions of dollars in development assistance targeted at helping partner coun-
tries to achieve a well-functioning government and to create a favourable institutional en-
vironment. In fact, over the past decade, the world has seen a remarkable growth of 
development aid under governance-related programmes. In 2008 alone, committed gov-
ernance programmes in the form of grants, loans and technical assistance reached 18.62 
billion US dollars, a three-fold increase compared to 1995.1 The number of active donor 
agencies in this field has also grown.2 The proliferation of donors engaged in the govern-
ance agenda, along with the need to develop strong institutions, has been partly driven by 
donor disbursement pressures, the controversies surrounding aid allocation and the active 
debate on new aid modalities (Booth 2008). 
Governance is also used as a ground for implementing new aid modalities. Decades of 
research on the effectiveness of traditional of project-based aid suggest weak impact and 
lack of ownership from partner countries. However, the discussion on whether new aid 
modalities, such as general budget support (GBS), are more effective than project-based 
aid persists. This is because, as briefly described here, the practice of GBS is accompanied 
by opportunities and risks (for more details, see Leiderer 2010). On the one hand, by di-
rectly transferring funds from donors to partners, GBS gives recipient governments more 
freedom in managing their development programmes. They have the opportunity to sup-
port and implement their projects according to their national development goals and pov-
erty reduction strategies. On the other hand, GBS is subject to such obvious fiduciary risks 
as fungibility, corruption and transparency issues.  
Governance therefore plays two critical roles in budget support: first, donors use it as one 
of their allocation criteria, meaning that governance is one of their considerations when 
they are deciding whether or not to provide budget support. To qualify for GBS, most 
budget support donors implicitly or explicitly require recipient countries to demonstrate 
credible policy structures and adequate levels of good governance (BMZ 2008; European 
Commission 2010; World Bank 2006). Second, some donors intend governance to be one 
of their objectives (although the importance they attach to it varies). The aim of GBS is to 
strengthen state institutions and support activities that improve accountability, public fi-
nancial management, public participation and political dialogues. Ultimately, the success 
                                                 
1 Source: Author’s calculation using disaggregated project level data from AidData accessed on 23 June 
2010. All amounts refer to commitments by all donors as reported in AidData, using constant 2000 
prices. The amount committed in 1995 was 4.8 billion US dollars. 
2  They include the World Bank, the UK Department for International Development, the United States 
Agency for International Development, the Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency, 
the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and, recently, the Millen-
nium Challenge Corporation.  
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of GBS depends partly on the prudent exercise of power and responsibility by the gov-
ernment.3  
The role of governance in GBS as a prerequisite and objective is an illustration of the ma-
jor part that governance plays in modern development policy and cooperation. In general, 
there is a broad consensus among donors regarding the consideration to be given to gov-
ernance in the overall allocation of aid. This notion stems from the World Bank’s 1998 
landmark publication Assessing Aid: What works, what doesn’t, and why. It argues that aid 
can have a significant impact on development only if recipient countries rise above certain 
thresholds of “good” governance. In fact, allocating aid to countries with a favourable 
institutional environment has become an integral part of donors’ strategic policies (Collier / 
Dollar 2004; IMF 1997; MCC 2010; USAID 2004; World Bank 1998). 
In theory, governance programmes, as a target of development aid, offer significant oppor-
tunities to improve institutional quality and political stability. Examples of these pro-
grammes are interventions to combat corruption, promote democracy, improve public 
services, ensure a fair election process and increase civic participation. Yet, despite the 
efforts of donors in financing governance programmes, relatively little is yet understood 
about their impact. For practitioners and policymakers, evaluation could provide important 
lessons yet the increasing demand for it is still unmet. For one thing, it is essential to know 
“what works?”, “what doesn’t?”, and “why” so that future interventions can be improved 
to ensure better results. Even though there is a growing consensus in the international 
community on the use of the qualitative and quantitative “mixed method” approach, the 
effectiveness of these programmes has relied mostly on descriptive case studies and anec-
dotal evidence. The desirability of adopting experimental or quasi-experimental ap-
proaches to evaluation is due to their ability to answer the question, “What would have 
happened without the intervention?”4  
Rigorous impact evaluations are probably rare because, first, governance programmes are 
often characterised by complex interventions routinely combining several activities and 
producing outcomes that are difficult to measure. Second, the topic lies outside the realm 
of most rigorous evaluators (Blattman 2008). Third, there appears to be a suspicion that 
only interventions producing statistically significant results have been publicised, while 
negative and insignificant results have remained undocumented (Duflo et al. 2007, for 
instance, give a thorough explanation of publication bias in experimental and non-
experimental evaluations). Fourth, such evaluation in governance is often associated with 
politically sensitive issues and is therefore difficult to undertake. And finally, there is a 
                                                 
3  To increase the effectiveness of budget support, donors also include non-financial inputs in the form of 
conditionality, technical assistance, policy dialogues and capacity-building. Achieving the goals of 
budget support set under the national development programmes or poverty reduction strategy (PRS) de-
pends on factors on both sides of the aid-delivery chain. On the recipient’s side, they include ownership, 
quality of strategies and commitment, while on the donor side, they consist of the quality of the non-
financial contributions mentioned above. Direct financial assistance serves to “strengthen the effective-
ness of non-financial inputs by acting as leverage for reforms, improvements of policy content, govern-
ance, and public financial management” (Leiderer 2010, 4). 
4  The terms “quantitative” and “rigorous” should not be used as synonyms. The use of quantitative meth-
ods does not automatically introduce appropriate rigour into an analysis. The term “rigour” means that 
the analysis has credibly established a valid counterfactual, or “what would the outcome have been in 
the absence of intervention,” through the use of experimental or quasi-experimental designs. To achieve 
this, the evaluation usually requires the use of certain quantitative evaluation methods.   
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shortage of reliable baseline and longitudinal data. As a result, evidence of effectiveness 
and of the lessons learnt is rather limited.  
The paper revisits these issues by attempting to answer three key questions: first, what are 
the features of governance interventions that make rigorous impact evaluation difficult and 
challenging? Second, what aspects of governance have been evaluated by quantitative 
methods? And third, what evaluation lessons can we learn from previous experience or 
what practical implications does it have. While much of the review of the literature fo-
cuses either on evaluation methods and applications in general (Angrist / Pischke 2009; 
Imbens / Wooldridge 2009; Khandker et al. 2010; Ravallion 2008) or on randomised con-
trol trials in specific fields (examples being Glewwe / Kremer 2006 on education, Moehler 
2010 on democracy promotion), few studies, as far as the author knows, have yet reviewed 
the quantitative methodologies that have been applied to governance evaluation (one 
example being Bollen et al. 2005).  
This paper attempts to close this gap (i) by providing an overview of the experimental and 
quasi-experimental approaches that have been adopted to evaluate governance pro-
grammes and (ii) by considering some implementation issues associated with them. It is 
mainly a “methods” paper, elaborating on what has been done by Caspari and Barbu 
(2008) in a previous study and, of course, by others. It does not attempt to provide a com-
plete review of all governance programmes, but rather to indicate when and how various 
rigorous impact evaluation techniques might be used. It will generally focus on the evalua-
tion of specific interventions or components of a larger programme, whether government 
or donor interventions. The scope of the review will be limited to existing literature, typi-
cally academic or technical articles and/or manuscripts produced in the last fifteen years. 
The paper is primarily aimed at audiences working on governance topics who are inter-
ested in conducting impact evaluation in this field. Some parts of the paper are technical, 
but every effort is made to give examples to ensure that the reader grasps the main ideas. 
The whole agenda and the examples are largely research-driven, but important lessons can 
nevertheless be learnt from them to somehow bridge research and practice. 
The paper suggests that there is considerable scope for evaluating certain types of govern-
ance interventions rigorously, perhaps far more than one would initially think. Admittedly, 
the applicability of quantitative techniques is subject to some limitations, but the interven-
tions can be broken down into components suitable for this type of analysis.  
Evidence suggests that some aspects of governance programmes have been subjected to 
rigorous impact evaluation. They concern accountability and corruption (Bertrand et al. 
2007; Grimes / Wängnerud 2010; Olken 2007; Reinikka / Svensson 2005), elections 
(Collier / Vicente 2010; Gerber et al. 2008; Gerber / Green 2000; Imai 2005), participation 
(Capuno / Garcia 2010; Humphreys et al. 2006), empowerment (Chattopadhyay / Duflo 
2004), service delivery (Duflo et al. 2005) and the rule of law (Ruprah 2008). However, 
this paper argues that the number of evaluation studies undertaking this type of analysis is 
still small. Consequently, there is very little evidence from which to infer with any confi-
dence the effectiveness of certain reforms and interventions, given that they have not been 
replicated or evaluated under different conditions.  
This study also suggests ways of overcoming recurrent obstacles encountered in the 
evaluation of governance programmes. They include a small sample size; outcome meas-
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urement; presence of spillovers; lack of baseline data; evaluation at higher levels of gov-
ernment; complex interventions: and full-coverage programmes. These problems are not 
new in the evaluation literature. In such heavily evaluated sectors as education, labour and 
health these challenges have already been tackled. This paper thus borrows from the les-
sons and experience of these sectors. 
The paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 discusses governance as a core aspect of de-
velopment cooperation. Chapter 3 explains the fundamental impact evaluation problem. 
Chapters 4 and 5 explain the standard experimental and quasi-experimental approaches 
and give an example in the governance context. Chapter 6 describes some of the main 
challenges encountered in the evaluation of governance programmes. The examples will 
be derived from heavily evaluated sectors (such as labour, education and health) that have 
experienced similar issues. Chapter 7 presents some practical implications for the design 
of governance programmes. Chapter 8 concludes the study.  
2 Governance as a core aspect of development cooperation 
2.1 The concept of governance 
The concept of governance is complex, unbounded and intangible. Its operations vary 
widely – from national to subnational government, from institutions to corporations and 
individuals. Donors, practitioners and researchers have developed their own definitions, 
which ultimately reflect part of their own research or political agenda, as the examples 
below show. Table 1 also presents some definitions of (good) governance from donor 
countries.  
• The BMZ (2009, 6) refers to governance as “the way decisions are taken and policies 
are framed and implemented in a state. It also includes political processes at supra-
national level and relevant regional organisations. The focus is on norms, institutions 
and procedures that regulate the actions of governmental, non-governmental and pri-
vate-sector players. On the one hand, it is about the values that underlie governance 
and, on the other, about the institutional frameworks in which governance takes 
place. The normative and institutional dimensions of governance can only be under-
stood in the light of the specific historical, cultural, social and economic context.” 
• The World Bank (1992, 1) defines governance as “the manner in which public offi-
cials and institutions acquire and exercise the authority to shape public policy and 
provide goods and services.”  
• The IMF (2007, 128) defines it as “the process by which decisions are made and im-
plemented (or not implemented). Within government, governance is the process by 
which public institutions conduct public affairs and manage public resources.”  
• A UNDP policy paper (1997) defines it as “the exercise of economic, political and 
administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises the 
mechanisms, processes and institutions, through which citizens and groups articulate 
their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their dif-
ferences.”  
• Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999, 1) define governance as the “traditions 
and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process 
by which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the  
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• government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and the respect of 
citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions 
among them.” 
• The Institute of Governance (2010) adopts a broader definition: “governance deter-
mines who has power, who makes decisions, how other players make their voice 
heard and how account is rendered.”  
The definition of the term “governance” has evolved over time. A UNDP report (2007, 3) 
classifies the concepts in three broad categories:  
“(1) governance, which is the most neutral and refers to sound public financial man-
agement; (2) good governance, which retains the economic and financial elements, 
but adds elements of accountability and transparency of decision-making, and the 
rule of law, especially the protection of property rights and respect for contracts; (3) 
democratic governance, which retains the elements of the previous definitions, but 
adds elements of democracy (especially horizontal and vertical accountability) and 
respect for human rights (civil, political, social and cultural).”  
In this paper, the term governance will generally focus on what the government does, en-
compassing all three of the above categories. Although many distinctions are made be-
tween them, this paper will not go into the conceptual debate in any depth.  
 
 
Table 1: Country definitions of governance and good governance 
Country Definition of (good) governance 
AUSAID “Good governance” means competent management of a country’s resources and affairs in 
a manner that is open, transparent, accountable, equitable and responsive to people’s 
needs.” (AusAid 2000, 3) 
ADC “In the context of a political and institutional environment that upholds human rights, 
democratic principles and the rule of law, good governance is the transparent and account-
able management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for the purposes of 
equitable and sustainable development.” (ADC 2006, 5) 
CIDA “Good” governance is the exercise of power by various levels of government that is effec-
tive, honest, equitable, transparent and accountable.” (CIDA 1999, 21) 
DFID “Governance is about the use of power and authority and how a country manages its af-
fairs. This can be interpreted at many different levels, from the state down to the local 
community or household.” (DFID 2007, 6) 
SIDA “Good governance and good public administration are important aspects of democracy. 
These concern the management and distribution of public resources, equality before the 
law and procedures to combat the abuse of power. ” (SIDA 2003, 24) 
USAID “Governance issues pertain to the ability of government to develop an efficient and effec-
tive public management process. Because citizens lose confidence in a government that is 
unable to deliver basic services, the degree to which a government is able to carry out its 
functions at any level is often a key determinant of a country’s ability to sustain democrat-
ic reform.” (USAID 1998, 19) 
Source:  Some parts extracted from UNDP (2007, 4). 
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For the systematic organisation of the wide range of topics in the three categories, this 
paper adopts a modified version of the OECD’s grouping (2008, 19) for governance as-
sessment. Table 2 groups topics according to four broad dimensions, namely: political 
system, public administration, social governance and market governance. Within each 
dimension, ‘political system’ comprises democracy promotion, human rights, conflict, rule 
of law and decentralisation. ‘Public administration’ covers corruption, public manage-
ment, public financial management, public procurement and tax policies. ‘Social govern-
ance’ consists of service delivery, citizen empowerment, community development and 
voice. And lastly, market governance involves the creation of a favourable business envi-
ronment and economic policy and planning. The third column contains examples of typi-
cal donor interventions within each governance dimension.  
Table 2: Governance dimensions, topics and activities 
Dimensions Topics Example of interventions 
Political system Democracy promotion  
(elections) 
Human rights 
Conflict 
Rule of law (judicial and 
legal development) 
Decentralisation 
Construction of ministerial building; 
demobilise combatants and support their reinte-
gration into civil life; 
freeing imprisoned child soldiers; 
training courses and workshops for officials of 
human rights institutions; 
training of court judges; 
encouraging youths to vote; 
supporting electoral procedures, such as comput-
erised voting systems; 
supporting the enactment of decentralisation laws; 
strengthening competitive party systems in 
emerging democracies 
Public  
administration 
Corruption  
Public management 
Public financial management 
Public procurement 
Tax policy 
Transparency 
Fiscal control mechanisms 
Annual audits of national entities;  
contributing to reallocation of public resources 
from military to socio-economic sectors; 
creating a regulatory framework to improve treas-
ury management;  
capacity-building in the accounting units by train-
ing X accounting officers;  
improve financial transactions by computerising 
revenue collection and expenditure management; 
creating anti-corruption agencies. 
Social governance Efficient public service deliv-
ery 
Citizen empowerment (e. g. 
women, voice, participation)  
Community development  
training and workshops for local CSOs, women 
and elders; 
Community audits; 
Market governance Economic policy and plan-
ning 
Business environment 
Training support, conferences and seminars 
Source:  Columns 1 and 2 are from OECD report (2008, p. 19), modified. 
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It is important to note that this categorisation is derived not from theory but rather from a 
survey of governance assessments made by donor agencies. Since the paper focuses on 
governance interventions, this classification serves the purpose of the paper. However, this 
is likely to change if some form of theoretical approach is adopted.  
It should also be noted that each dimension may have overlapping topics. Projects on cor-
ruption, which is covered by ‘public administration,’ may have a rule-of-law component 
(under ‘political system’). This list is not therefore intended to be definitive or exhaustive, 
but rather to act as a framework for the discussion, given the breadth and depth of the con-
cept.  
2.2 Aid for governance 
Governance is at the heart of the aid effectiveness debate. It is both an objective of and 
condition for development assistance. In practice, donors have often used a combination of 
loans, grants and technical assistance to promote good governance. With the help of Aid-
Data,5 one of the most comprehensive aid databases, this section seeks to provide some 
insight into donor interest in the field of governance.  
Table 3 shows the amount committed by donors to projects whose dominant sector is clas-
sified as governance. It reveals that donor interest moved from market governance in 1995 
to political systems in 2008. It also demonstrates that ‘political systems,’ comprising such 
thematic issues as elections, human rights, conflict and legal and judicial development, has 
grown tremendously over the last decade, having accounted for 5.24 per cent of total gov-
ernance assistance in 1995 and 38.63 per cent in 2008. The share of projects devoted to 
public administration peaked in 2005 and slowly declined thereafter (from 29.6 per cent in 
2005 to 16.11 per cent in 2008). Nevertheless, it continued to have a modest share of de-
velopment projects. Projects involving women, civil society and access to information 
have consistently captured about 10 to 14 per cent of governance aid since 1995.  
Table 3 shows that development assistance was increasingly focused on more fragile, 
emerging conflict and post-conflict states, as evidenced by the larger share of projects 
classified under “conflict” (rising from 1.51 to 16.31 per cent). The smallest share went to 
elections, public financial management and human rights.  
As “governance” has become more important, name-changing or reclassification by do-
nors may have taken place. For instance, what was classified as “education at subnational 
level” can be classified under ‘decentralisation.’ This highlights one of the problematic 
issues in aid data collection. Others are unclassified items, reporting errors and redundant 
accounting. Nevertheless, the initiative of donors and researchers in creating and improv-
ing a standardised project-level aid database to shed light on past and present trends in 
development assistance is already a huge leap forward. But more needs to be done. 
 
                                                 
5  Findley et al. (2009). 
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In sum, the current trend shows that investments in governance programmes have greatly 
increased over the last decade. Yet, despite the efforts of donors and the international 
community to finance governance programmes, relatively little is yet understood about 
their impact. The changes in the aggregate measurements of governance established by 
many index producers and the amount of money spent may be correlated and may substan-
tiate donor efforts, but they are not sufficient proof of a tangible impact. The scale of in-
vestment presupposes careful evaluation of the impact of governance programmes, so that 
questions regarding its effectiveness and what could be done better in the future may be 
addressed.  
Table 3: Donor assistance in governance 
Topic/Year 1995 2000 2005 2007 2008 
Political system 5.2 % 23.2 % 25.5 % 31.7 % 38.6 % 
 Conflict 1.5 % 14.1 % 11.2 % 16.2 % 16.3 % 
 Elections 0.9 % 1.1 % 3.7 % 2.5 % 3.1 % 
 Human rights 1.9 % 4.1 % 4.9 % 4.2 % 8.1 % 
 Rule of law 1.0 % 4.0 % 5.7 % 8.8 % 11.2 % 
Public administration 19.4 % 14.9 % 29.6 % 22.4 % 16.1 % 
 Public-sector financial  
 management 1.0 % 2.3 % 2.2 % 3.9 % 5.0 % 
 Government administration 18.3 % 12.7 % 27.4 % 18.6 % 11.1 % 
Social development 11.4 % 9.8 % 10.2 % 11.5 % 14.5 % 
 Women 2.1 % 1.1 % 1.1 % 1.9 % 2.5 % 
 Civil society 9.2 % 8.2 % 8.6 % 8.2 % 10.8 % 
 Access to information 0.1 % 0.5 % 0.5 % 1.5 % 1.2 % 
Market/economic governance 33.9 % 8.7 % 12.6 % 10.7 % 9.8 % 
Others (not classified) 30.1 % 43.3 % 22.1 % 23.6 % 21.0 % 
TOTAL (in billion USD, constant 2000 
prices) 4.86 7.32 12.93 15.30 18.62 
Notes:  
1. As unclassified governance aid is quite substantial, commitment amounts in each dimension may have 
been over- or underestimated.  
2. Owing to the huge amount of information that needs to be collected, some projects may have been unin-
tentionally omitted.  
3. A project may appear in the database more than once if multiple donors are involved, the donor commits 
new money or the donor splits the projects into several activities. Since there is no unique project identi-
fier, this may cause overestimation of the number of development projects (Findley et al. 2009). 
4. The amount reflected in these data does not include general budget support, much of which is devoted to 
improving such governance structures as public financial management.  
Source:  Author’s calculation derived from AidData, accessed 23 June 2010. The figures reflect amounts 
committed by donors. 
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2.3 Design of governance programmes 
Donor assistance to the governance agenda typically combines policy advice, technical 
assistance, grants and loans. These interventions are designed to achieve certain outcomes, 
such as decreasing corrupt practices, increasing voter turnout and improving the delivery 
of public services. This agenda and those adopted for other sectors are not mutually exclu-
sive. Some features of anti-poverty, education or infrastructure programmes embed gov-
ernance in their design and execution. Governance interventions thus usually complement 
other sector projects or programmes. 
The governance topics mentioned in the previous section come in three forms when evalu-
ated: (i) as an intervention aimed at achieving a certain development outcome, (ii) as an 
outcome of an intervention or (iii) both. Thus the positioning of governance in the logical 
framework of inputs and outcomes is not fixed. Of course, it may also cover the whole 
range from inputs and processes to outputs, but for the purpose of this discussion a simpli-
fied version of input-outcome will be used. Governance evaluation may be examined us-
ing three separate linkages (as in Moehler 2010). The first linkage runs from assessing a 
socio-economic intervention with an expected governance outcome. The second linkage 
indicates the intrinsic value of governance to development. And the third identifies the 
link between governance intervention and specific governance goals. Figure 1 illustrates 
this. 
Linkage 1: Governance intervention with intended socio-economic (or environmental) 
outcome 
In principle, governance reforms should lead to socio-economic development. Welfare 
should improve because governance interventions are meant to (i) increase the efficiency 
of public service delivery, (ii) decrease wastage of public funds (iii) empower citizens to 
make the government accountable, etc.  
Figure 1: Simplified design of governance programmes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s representation. 
INTERVENTION
 
 
OUTCOME
 
 
 
Governance 
 
 
Socio-economic   
  
Governance
  
  
Governance
 
Socio-economic 
 
 
Governance
Melody Garcia 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik 14 
An example of a governance intervention with social outcomes is given in the study con-
ducted by Reinikka and Svensson (2005). The intervention is what they termed a ‘govern-
ance innovation’ in the form of a newspaper campaign serving as an anti-corruption 
instrument. The aims were to minimise the capture of public funds by district officials and 
to empower schools to monitor those funds and claim what they were entitled to. The ul-
timate objective of the campaign was to increase school enrolment and performance. In 
this sense, governance interventions are instruments for improving specific social and 
economic outcomes. 
Linkage 2: Socio-economic (or environmental) intervention with intended governance 
outcome 
Social programmes may also embed governance outcomes in their design. For example, 
Grimes and Wängnerud (2010) examined the effect of a conditional cash transfer (CCT) 
programme in Mexico on corruption. The main aim of CCT programmes is to alleviate 
poverty by increasing children’s school attendance and health visits. However, combating 
administrative corruption, as in this case, was the secondary aim of the project. Thus 
socio-economic interventions do not necessarily reflect socio-economic outcomes: they 
may have direct or indirect governance consequences.  
Linkage 3: Governance intervention with intended governance outcome 
Governance could also be an outcome of a programme that seeks to address governance 
issues directly. Collier and Vicente (2010) investigated the impact of a grassroots anti-
violence campaign on voters’ behaviour. This intervention involved the following activi-
ties: town meetings, street theatres and the distribution of campaign materials. It is hoped 
that this will combat voter intimidation by decreasing the perceived threat to individual 
voters.   
3 Impact evaluation  
The ultimate goal of impact evaluation (IE) is to determine the extent to which observed 
outcomes can be attributed to the programme, and to the programme alone. According to 
the definition of the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie), IE measures “the 
net change in outcomes amongst a particular group, or groups of people that can be attri-
buted to a specific program using the best methodology available, feasible and appropri-
ate to the evaluation question(s) being investigated and to the specific context” (3ie s. a. a, 
1). Similarly, the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG s. a., 1) defines IE as 
“the systematic identification of the effects, positive or negative, intended or not, on indi-
vidual households, institutions, and the environment caused by a given development ac-
tivity such as a program or project.” IE provides information on whether the programme 
has had an impact and on the magnitude of that impact. Because of this, it is an important 
source of information for policymakers and development institutions seeking to justify the 
implementation and expansion of a programme.  
The IEG lists four impact evaluation models: (i) rapid assessment or review, conducted 
ex-post, (ii) ex-post comparison of project beneficiaries with a control group using multi-
variate analyses, (iii) quasi-experimental design using matched control and treatment 
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groups and (iv) randomised design. The IEG classifies the last two models as rigorous 
impact evaluations. It emphasises that “the strong advantage of these two methods is that 
they are the most reliable for establishing causality – the relationship between a specific 
intervention and actual impacts – and for estimating the magnitude of impact attributable 
to the intervention” (IEG s. a., 3) .  
A broader (though similar) description of rigorous impact evaluation is provided by 3ie: 
“rigorous impact evaluations are those which tackle the attribution problem. The main 
challenges to be addressed in attribution are: (1) allowing for confounding factors, (2) 
selection bias arising from the endogeneity of program placement, (3) spillover effects, (4) 
contamination of the control and (5) impact heterogeneity” (3ie s. a. a, 1).  
Common to these descriptions is that RIE entails the inclusion of quantitative elements in 
the design of the evaluation, as well as qualitative analysis to tease out and validate the 
effects of the intervention. As will be argued in subsequent sections, addressing this attri-
bution problem adequately usually entails the use of experimental or quasi-experimental 
approaches.6  
The need to enhance development effectiveness has prompted a tremendous growth of 
interest in impact evaluation studies in recent years. At the same time, a better understand-
ing of the technical difficulties of the appropriate attribution of outcomes has led to in-
creasing calls for more ‘rigorous’ impact evaluations to address the problem of causality. 
The push towards evidence-based development policy has consequently led to many rig-
orous impact studies being conducted in various economic and social sectors. Heavily 
evaluated programmes have been implemented in such subject areas as labour (Angrist / 
Krueger 1999), health and nutrition (Gaarder et al. 2010; Habicht et al. 2009), water and 
infrastructure (van de Walle 2009; Waddington et al. 2009), agriculture (Duflo et al. 2008) 
and education (Glewwe / Kremer 2006). By comparison, relatively little attention has been 
paid to the rigorous evaluation of governance. Despite the challenges posed by and limited 
experience of the evaluation of governance, rigorous evaluations of some promising as-
pects have already been undertaken. Moreover, the international community and donor 
agencies7 appear to have made significant efforts to bridge this gap in recent years. 
3.1 Applying the general principles 
Because of the growing popularity of quantitative approaches to solving the problem of 
attribution, donor agencies are under mounting pressure to comply. However, such ap-
proaches should not be overdone. Both evaluators and donors should establish whether or 
not a quantitative approach is feasible. As a rule, it is important first to identify the evalua-
                                                 
6  There are general debates regarding the roles of quantitative and qualitative impact evaluations as well 
as methodological disputes over the applicability/accuracy of quasi-experimental approaches over ran-
domised designs. This study will not cover these debates: see White (2006) for a thorough discussion.   
7  Some of the organisations that actively conduct rigorous governance evaluations are the Jameel Poverty 
Action Lab (JPAL), the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the United States  
Agency for International Development (USAID), the Swedish International Development Co-operation 
Agency and, recently, the Millennium Challenge Corporation. The International Initiative for Impact 
Evaluation has funded several evaluations in India, eastern Congo and Sierra Leone in 2010, online: 
http://www.3ieimpact.org/openwindow/round2/.  
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tion questions and to understand the design of the programme before the search for an 
appropriate method begins, and not vice versa (searching for questions that can be ad-
dressed by a method).  
Although generalisation is often not possible, the advantage of using a qualitative ap-
proach is that it provides a good contextual basis, which the other approach frequently 
lacks. White (2006) argues that there should not be a trade off between quantitative and 
qualitative approaches. Qualitative data provide context and appropriate interpretation of 
quantitative results. In fact, the combination of the two, known as the mixed methods ap-
proach, should produce “the strongest evaluative findings, combining well-contextualized 
studies with quantitative rigor” (White 2006, 2). Box 1 sets out important standards to be 
observed in impact evaluation.  
 
The application of experimental and quasi-experimental methods to solve the problem of 
attribution is subject to general limitations.  
• First, they require good data, usually drawn from surveys. 
• Second, the allocation of the treatment must be designed in certain ways, which may 
not be practicable. 
Box 1: Principles of theory-based impact evaluation 
The aim of theory-based impact evaluation is to determine why an intervention has had an impact, rather 
than knowing only that it has had one. The six steps in the successful adoption of this approach are as 
follows: 
(1) Map out the causal chain (programme theory). This step involves constructing a detailed flow 
chart of the causal chain from inputs to outcomes and impact. It seeks to test the underlying assump-
tion embedded along the causal chain, also taking into account the changing dynamics of the inter-
vention and of unintended impacts.  
(2) Understand context. Context is defined as the socio-economic and political setting in which an 
intervention takes place. Apart from revealing the factors that may explain why an intervention has 
had an impact, it plays an important role in indicating how similar interventions may have different 
impacts. This step requires the reading of project documents and of more general literature on an-
thropology or political economy.  
(3) Anticipate heterogeneity. This means that the evaluator must be aware of the possibility of an inter-
vention having various impacts. The differences may be due to the social and political setting, the be-
haviour of the target groups, the existence of other interventions or the design of the intervention 
itself.  
(4) Rigorous evaluation of impact using a credible counterfactual. The construction of a credible 
counterfactual, or control group, involves the use of an experimental and quasi-experimental ap-
proach to tease out the effect of the treatment. This was briefly discussed earlier and is the core topic 
of the following chapters. It is a key aspect in theory-based impact evaluation.  
(5) Rigorous factual analysis. Apart from counterfactual analysis, factual analysis is needed to confirm 
whether the intervention has reached the targeted groups and whether it has actually changed their 
behaviour. This type of question reveals any potential breakdown in the causal chain that could lead 
to low impact.  
(6) Use mixed methods. This refers to the combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches in the 
same evaluation. The qualitative aspect involves a wide range of activities, including the reading of 
project documents, focus group discussions, literature review and field work.  
Source:  White (2009). 
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• Third, a relatively large sample size is needed, which means that the unit of analysis 
must be large enough for statistical tests to be conducted.  
• Fourth, they may not be applicable to certain interventions, this being especially true 
of reforms at national level.  
In practice, quantitative analysis may have to be restricted to certain components of the 
programme, especially where interventions are highly complex. In such cases, unbundling 
various activities and measuring their impact will be one option.  
This paper focuses on the fourth principle in Box 1, where impact is measured with the aid 
of a credible counterfactual. This does not imply that other principles must be neglected. 
In fact, the validity of findings may be greatly reduced if the focus is limited to this aspect 
only and context specificity is omitted. However, for the sake of brevity, the case studies 
presented in the following chapters will focus solely on impact measurement. For more 
details of the overall project aim, intervention logic and theory of change, the original pa-
pers should also be consulted.  
3.2 The problem of attribution 
Impact evaluation analyses the impact of an intervention on welfare outcomes. Interven-
tion may take the form of policies, programmes or projects. In reality, changes in outcome 
may be only partly due to the intervention, and sometimes not at all. Thus, the fundamen-
tal problem with evaluation is how to establish attribution, i. e. to determine that the out-
come is the result of the intervention and not of any other factors. It raises the issue of the 
counterfactual, “the comparison of what actually happened and what would have hap-
pened in the absence of intervention” (White 2006).  
Formally, impact is the difference in outcome Y, with Y1 denoting the outcome if a person 
is exposed to the intervention, and Y0 is the outcome if he/she is not.  
01 YYimpact −=    (1) 
At a given point in time, it is possible to observe only the outcome of the person being 
exposed to treatment, but not the outcome of his/her not being exposed. In other words, 
failure to observe both states at the same time poses a dilemma for equation 1. The main 
challenge to impact evaluation is therefore to find the valid counterfactual. In the search 
for a valid counterfactual, the two common comparison groups often considered, but in-
sufficient if considered separately, are (i) data on the same individuals before and after the 
intervention and (ii) data on a group of individuals who participated in the programme and 
another group who did not or, in short, with and without intervention. 
To illustrate the problem of impact evaluation and why these two comparison groups are 
not valid counterfactuals, the following is a simplified hypothetical scenario: 
Imagine that developing country X suffers from widespread corruption and bribery in the 
enforcement of traffic regulations. Unlike most developed countries, any traffic violation 
in country X requires the motorist concerned to surrender his licence. Issuing tickets for 
traffic violations is often ineffective unless the fine is collected on the spot because of the 
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poor information-tracking system that is a common feature of developing countries. Traf-
fic enforcers (i. e. the police) accept and often solicit bribes to compensate for their low 
wages, while motorists offer bribes to avoid fines, the confiscation of their licences, long 
queues to recover their licences and, in the case of serious violations, mandatory seminars. 
Thus bribes generate extra income for the police and also reduce transaction costs for mo-
torists. The Traffic Enforcement Authority (TEA) is a public agency responsible for en-
forcing traffic regulations. It has proposed to the president of country X that the problem 
of corruption and bribery among traffic enforcers should be solved. The inception report 
contains several hundred pages of proposed interventions. Of the many interventions pro-
posed by the TEA, the following appeal to the president: 
1. Set up a complaints system enabling motorists to identify erring policemen by text 
message. 
2. Launch a quota system for traffic enforcers requiring them to catch and report 10 traf-
fic violators per month. The number of violators caught will be linked directly to the 
enforcers’ performance assessment.  
3. Set up a rapid licence retrieval system that enables motorists to pay by credit card and 
the license to be sent to the address they specify. 
4. Conduct corruption awareness programmes by training traffic enforcers. 
The president and the TEA appreciate the difficulty associated with quantifying govern-
ance outcomes and acknowledge that each intervention may require a different set of data 
– provided by the policeman and/or the motorist. The survey data on the police will pro-
vide information on their self-assessed performance, while data from motorists will reveal 
what the public think of police performance. These two sets of data can show whether and 
how the police perception and the public perception match. After careful consideration of 
the pros and cons of each intervention and of the limited budget, the group finally decides 
to launch a quota system for traffic enforcers. In this way, the police are obliged to in-
crease their efforts and to report their results (in respect of the 10 violators at least), which 
may help to reduce the incentive to accept bribes. Although this may not rein in corruption 
altogether, the policymakers believe that the improvement of police performance will re-
duce inefficiencies in service delivery to a minimum.  
Partly due to budget constraints the TEA decides to begin by gathering survey data on 
police performance (and to conduct the public survey later). To demonstrate the effective-
ness of the intervention, the TEA selects 30 policemen whom they apply the quota system. 
They measure the success of the programme by comparing the number of reported viola-
tions the year before the quota system was introduced with the number of reported viola-
tions the following year. They find that the quota system increases the number of reported 
violations by an average of 87 per cent. From this result, the TEA concludes that the pro-
gramme is effective.  
The president wisely communicates her doubts about the calculation. Impacts of govern-
ance interventions are very likely to be confounded by unexpected political developments, 
such as the passing of a new law and elections and economic shocks such as food short-
ages, the discovery of oil or a drought. If only reported violations before and after are con-
sidered, the results will be biased owing to the failure to take account of time-varying 
factors that could affect the outcome over the period. This means that the factors responsi-
ble for the change cannot be attributed to the intervention alone, other plausible explana-
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tions possibly including the passage of time or the sudden occurrence of an event. The 
TEA asks, “Does this mean that the effect of the quota programme is rather small, since 
the policemen treated would have increased their catches anyway?” “That’s possible,” 
replies the president.  
The president illustrates her explanation with a graph. The average number of violations 
reported by the individuals in the programme before the intervention is, for instance, 15 
per month (t=0, point A). After a year, the average number of reported violations has risen 
to 28 per month (t=1, point B). The impact is equal to 13 calculated as B minus A. But is 
the increase in the number of reported violations due to the programme alone? That is not 
very likely. An increase in the number of reported violations following the dismissal of a 
corrupt high-level TEA official may generate confidence in the system and lead to a rise in 
the number of violations reported by the police (t=1, point C). The real impact is therefore 
the difference between points B and C, the impact having previously been overestimated. 
Likewise, promoting a highly corrupt TEA official reduces confidence in the political sys-
tem and results in a lower number of reported violations (t=1, point D). The impact has 
therefore been initially underestimated, and the real impact is between points B and D. 
This before-and-after approach fails to take account of time-varying factors that may af-
fect the impact measure. 
 
Figure 2: Before-and-after scenario 
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Source:  Author’s representation. 
To calculate whether the quota system has an impact or not, it must be known how many 
violations the policemen would have reported if they had not participated in the quota sys-
tem. Unfortunately, the same policemen cannot be observed in both circumstances. The 
TEA therefore constructs a comparison group and finds that the participants in the quota 
system reported, on average, more violations than those who participated in the pro-
gramme. Here again, the conclusion is that the intervention has had a positive impact.  
But the president is still not convinced. Why not? She wants to know how the individuals 
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that the programme therefore works for them, but may not have the same effect on others. 
The president explains that, to solve this problem, it will be necessary to find a compari-
son group for whom, in the absence of intervention, the outcome would have been similar 
to the outcome for those who received treatment. Simply choosing a group of individuals 
who did not participate in the programme does not produce a valid counterfactual. In other 
words, evaluators cannot simply include policemen who do not take part in the pro-
gramme because there may be underlying differences between the two groups that have 
not been taken into account. It also needs to be understood how certain individuals are 
assigned to the quota system. In a situation where policemen volunteer to join the pro-
gramme, it is important to understand why they do so and others do not. Are the partici-
pants more motivated than the non-participants? The inherent difference, both observable 
and unobservable, between the two groups is usually known as selection bias. If this is not 
taken into consideration, the impact estimates could produce misleading results.  
Solving the problem 
Ideally, policemen should be randomly assigned to the quota system at the start of the 
programme. Eventually, two groups will be formed: those who belong to the quota group 
and those who do not. As the number of policemen in both groups increases, the differ-
ence in terms of extraneous factors should even out until the only remaining difference 
between the two is the intervention.  
Since it is already too late for randomisation, combining the before-and-after approach and 
with-and-without comparison can itself yield credible estimates. To ensure that the pre-
treatment differences in the control and treatment groups are taken into account, statistical 
techniques for correcting for selection bias, such as propensity score matching and instru-
mental variables, can be used to improve the impact estimate. (More on this in the next 
chapters).  
The example highlights the importance of arriving at the right conclusion through an ap-
propriate understanding of how impact is measured. From the perspective of both the gov-
ernment and aid agencies, the risk of discontinuing an anti-corruption project which is in 
fact effective or of institutionalising a policy which is in fact ineffective is too high. The 
resources and efforts expended on such projects can be justified only by means of impact 
evaluation.  
In general, experimental and quasi-experimental designs seek to address the selection bias 
due to purposive programme placement or individual heterogeneity stemming from bene-
ficiaries’ self-selection to the programme (see Box 2 for a brief description of the quantita-
tive techniques). It is important to note that each technique is accompanied by underlying 
assumptions of how the counterfactual problem is resolved. Further, the design of the pro-
gramme usually dictates the most appropriate technique.  
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4 Experimental or Randomised Control Trials (RCTs) 
Randomisation removes the selection bias by randomly assigning individuals to treatment 
or comparison (control) groups. Since individuals are randomly assigned, the inherent 
differences between the two groups should, on average, be cancelled out as the sample 
size increases, and what remains is the effect of the treatment.  
In theory, randomisation occurs in two stages. In the first stage a group of individuals is 
randomly selected from the entire population, and in the second stage these individuals are 
randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. The first stage is necessary for exter-
nal validity (applicability for scaling-up), while the second stage is needed to test for in-
ternal validity (Khandker et al. 2010).  
Once the samples have been gathered, calculating the impact is straightforward. A simple 
test of means between the two samples can be made, although a simple regression frame-
work is more appropriate, especially in cases where randomisation is conditional on some 
observed variables. To illustrate this, a simple regression framework in the case of the 
two-stage pure randomisation mentioned earlier can be formulated as (Duflo et al. 2007):  
 
Box 2: Impact evaluation techniques 
Impact is calculated as the difference in outcome with and without intervention. But since it is not possi-
ble to collect data from a single individual or subject in both circumstances – in the presence and absence 
of intervention – various IE techniques can be applied to circumvent the problem of missing data and to 
arrive at an unbiased estimate of the impact. The application of these techniques largely depends on how 
the intervention will be or has been implemented and on the design of the experiment in general.  
Randomisation: This approach requires that participants be randomly assigned to treatment. The random 
assignment generates two groups of participants, the control and the treatment group. As the number of 
sample participants increases, the difference between the two groups in terms of extraneous factors should 
even out until the only remaining difference is the intervention.  
Instrumental variable (IV): In simple terms, this approach involves identifying a special variable that 
affects outcome and intervention, but without the two having any causality. IV approach is needed if the 
causal relationship between intervention and outcome run the opposite direction. Such a scenario occurs 
when (i) the intervention has been deliberately targeted or (ii) participants have joined the programme for 
specific reasons. This implies that potential unobserved characteristics or omitted variables have not been 
taken into account.  
Difference-in-differences (DID): This double-difference approach calculates impact by utilising infor-
mation before –and after the intervention and calculating the change in outcome over the two periods 
between the control and treatment groups.  
Propensity score matching (PSM): To minimise confounding factors due to the non-random assignment 
of the intervention, matching requires finding a comparison group that matches the characteristics of the 
treatment group. The observable characteristics are used to generate a propensity score, which is the prob-
ability of participation. Each treated individual is matched to a non-participant on the basis of this propen-
sity score. 
Regression discontinuity design (RDD): RDD require a specific eligibility rule in the targeting of par-
ticipants for the programme. The degree to which the intervention changes the outcome of the treatment 
group compared to non-participants near the eligibility cut-off is the impact.  
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iii TY εβα ++=                                 (2) 
where Y is the individual outcome, Ti is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual belongs to 
the treatment group and 0 if he belongs to the control group. The treatment effect,8 which 
is the difference between the control and treatment group, is captured by βˆ . RCT is known 
as the “gold standard” in impact evaluation because of its high internal validity, and it is 
superior to quasi-experimental designs. By randomly assigning treatment, RCT is also 
considered to be one of the most equitable ways of allocating limited resources. 
Corruption 
The first example addresses the different monitoring schemes used to reduce corruption 
which have been promoted by many donor agencies. Some scholars argue that a top-down 
approach is effective in reducing corruption if individuals are provided with the right bal-
ance of monitoring and incentives (Becker / Stigler 1974). The problem with this method 
is that the very officials who are assigned to do the monitoring may also be corrupt. The 
alternative approach underscores the power of grassroots participation. Since citizens are 
the direct beneficiaries of public services, they have the incentive to monitor the perform-
ance of their public officials. But this, too, has a disadvantage. Reducing corruption in 
public affairs is a public good and subject to free-rider problems, which means that lazy 
citizens cannot be prevented from benefiting from the contribution made by active indi-
viduals who monitor corrupt officials. They may not want to share the cost of supervision 
and may leave the responsibility to others. In the end, nobody has any incentive to moni-
tor. Whether or not top-down and bottom-up approaches reduce corruption therefore re-
quires deeper investigation.  
To answer this question, Olken (2007) conducted a field experiment in the context of road 
projects in Indonesia financed by the World Bank nationwide. Six hundred and eight vil-
lages were randomly selected and divided into four groups. Olken informed the selected 
villages in the first group that the road would be audited by central government. In the 
second group, he organised village-level accountability meetings. In the third group, he 
again organised accountability meetings and, in addition, anonymous survey forms were 
distributed to villagers. The fourth group served as the control group. Since it is difficult to 
capture corrupt practices, he constructed a simple measure of corruption. Instead of using 
perception-based corruption measure, he devised a direct measure of corruption as the 
difference between reported expenditure and the independent engineers’ estimate. The 
independent estimate was derived from the samples taken by the engineers after project 
completion to measure the quantity of materials used from interviews with villagers to 
determine the wages paid and from a survey of suppliers carried out to estimate prices. He 
found that increasing government audits had a positive effect by reducing corruption. 
“Missing expenditures” fell by eight percentage points when the villages were audited by 
central government. He also found that grassroots participation in monitoring had no im-
pact. Rapid assessments and M&E approaches to evaluation may lead to a different con-
                                                 
8  The treatment effect of a programme is usually represented by two aggregate measurements: (i) the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), defined as the average gain of those who are treated con-
ditional on their receiving treatment and (ii) the average treatment effect (ATE), which is the difference 
between treatment and control groups randomly drawn from the whole population. In this paper, the 
treatment effect referred to is the ATT, which will be the main concern in the discussion. See Khandker 
et al. (2010) and Ravallion (2008) for a further discussion and the derivation of the ATT and ATE. 
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clusion. Olken’s result is convincing because, through randomisation, he ensured that the 
only difference between the treatment and control groups was the intervention.9  
In another example the consequences of corruption are examined. Is corruption efficient? 
Is it harmful to society (Rose-Ackerman 1978), or does it merely reduce transaction costs 
by speeding up bureaucratic processes (Huntington 1968)? Understanding the implications 
of corruption can provide clues to the anti-corruption strategies that may improve the effi-
ciency and fairness of governments.  
Bertrand et al. (2007) set out to answer these questions by following a sample of candi-
dates applying for driving licences in India. Eight hundred and twenty-two candidates 
were tracked, all of them eventually taking a surprise independent driving test. The au-
thors wanted to know whether corruption can speed up the application process and 
whether it helps individuals unqualified to drive to obtain a licence. To this end, candi-
dates were randomly assigned to one of the three groups. The “bonus group” received a 
financial bonus if they obtained their licences quickly (within 32 days). The “lesson 
group” was offered free driving lessons. And finally, the third was a control group that 
was simply monitored throughout the process. The results of the experiment showed that 
individuals in the bonus group were 24 percentage points more likely to obtain a licence 
than individuals in the control group. They were also likely to obtain a licence without 
taking the driving test and more likely to obtain a licence but fail the independent driving 
test, which shows that corruption may be harmful to society. The lesson group was only 
12 percentage points more likely to obtain a license than the control group. This suggests 
that being a good driver is not necessarily a guarantee of obtaining a licence. In fact, indi-
viduals in the lesson group also made additional payments to “agents” despite being better 
drivers. Like Olken’s approach, this experimental method allowed the authors to disentan-
gle the impact of the intervention from other factors, whereas simply conducting a survey 
and asking individuals whether or not they had made extra payments to obtain a licence 
might have led to the conclusion that no corruption had taken place. Careful randomisation 
led the authors to the opposite conclusion.   
Democracy promotion 
The third example shows how RCTs can be used to evaluate interventions in democracy 
promotion. Democratic processes in developing countries are weak because some voters 
are less well informed or because of elite capture. Elections often feature ballot fraud, vio-
lence and vote-buying. To minimise this, donors have deployed international observers to 
new democracies to monitor the election process. While some argue that international ob-
servers help increase voters’ confidence and discourage fraud, observers are not necessar-
ily objective and may carry with them the political thrust of their own countries. Whether 
outside assistance helps or harms the election process is a very important empirical ques-
tion.  
To capture the impact of international election observers on election quality, Hyde (2010) 
randomly assigned international observers during the 2004 presidential election in Indone-
sia to villages identifiable on a local map, in each of which they visited one to four polling 
                                                 
9  Note that this is a one-period intervention and results may change over time. For instance, community 
participation, when strongly cultivated over time, may actually have an impact in the long run.  
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stations. The random assignment generated two groups of villages, those that were ob-
served and those that were not. Her results show that, as international observers tend to 
increase the total number of votes cast for the incumbent, they may change voters’ elec-
tion-day behaviour disproportionately. She also found that election officials tend to take 
greater care to comply with election regulations if international observers are present.  
Another experimental study of democracy promotion focuses on clientelism and vote-
buying in developing countries. Clientelism consists in personal and material favours done 
by candidates for an individual voter or group of voters in exchange for political support. 
Do voters respond to the offer of favours more than public policy messages? Public policy 
messages are nationally oriented and concern such aspects as public health and child wel-
fare. Are female voters more likely to respond to offers of favours? In most developing 
countries, candidates rely on personal favours to obtain political support. Whether this is 
an effective strategy or not has major implications for democracy promotion. Randomised 
designs have been increasingly used to enable some initial conclusions to be drawn.  
Wantchekon (2003) investigated the voting behaviour of the citizens of Benin during the 
presidential elections of 2001. He randomly assigned villages to three groups, the first 
receiving a clientelistic message, the second “broad, nationally oriented” messages and the 
third both kinds of message. His experiment showed that clientelism increases the prob-
ability of votes going to regional and incumbent candidates, but is less popular among 
women, who are more attracted to the public-policy type of campaigning.   
The examples described here show that RCTs provide new evidence that refutes what was 
initially hypothesised at the programming stage. In the case of corruption, the implicit 
assumption was that grassroots monitoring was central in eliminating local corruption. 
The evidence challenges this hypothesis and encourages further evaluation to see if the 
findings are similar in different settings.  
A broader message conveyed by the examples concerns the feasibility of applying RCTs 
in evaluating such difficult concepts as corruption and democracy promotion, rather than 
the success of the intervention itself. These examples have proved that the method is not 
only theoretically appealing, but can also be managed in the field. As it is also very simple 
to understand, the RCT method is becoming increasingly popular in social policy. 
Moehler (2010) has identified 41 RCT studies on democracy and governance that used 
randomised field experiments. She found that substantial work has been done on elections, 
community-driven development and improved public service delivery.  
However, she noted that that work largely focuses on interventions at village or commu-
nity level, mainly because RCTs require large samples. This requirement highlights one of 
the drawbacks of conducting experimental (and, more so, quasi-experimental) techniques. 
Other important considerations include ethical issues arising from the withholding of 
treatment from the most needy, the time taken to prepare for evaluation before programme 
roll-out, the unwillingness of individuals to participate, the complexity of intervention, 
institutional factors and costs (Burtless 1995; Heckman / Smith 1995). Needless to say, the 
rule of thumb is to randomise whenever possible, although a number of practical obstacles 
may prevent randomisation. The next chapter identifies alternative approaches to evaluat-
ing governance programmes.  
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5 Quasi-experimental designs 
When random placement of the programme is not feasible, various quasi-experimental 
approaches can be adopted to construct the counterfactual or “what would have happened 
without the intervention.” Among the most popular of these approaches are difference-in-
differences, instrumental variables, propensity score matching and regression discontinuity 
designs, which will be described in this chapter.   
The suitability of each approach depends on the design of the programme and the nature 
of the dataset. The use of these methods requires assumptions regarding the characteristics 
of the data, which are not directly testable. Provided that this is borne in mind, a quasi-
experimental approach is nonetheless a powerful tool if used in conjunction with a theory-
based approach to contextualise the quantitative findings (White 2006). The next five sec-
tions describe these alternative approaches in detail and give examples relating to govern-
ance.  
5.1 Difference-in-differences (DID) approach 
If randomisation is unlikely and the programme has already been rolled out, the differ-
ence-in-differences technique can be applied as long as baseline and post-intervention data 
are available for both the treatment and the control group. The idea behind the difference-
in-differences approach (commonly known as DID) is to compare the outcome in the case 
of one group of individuals who received the programme with the outcome in the case of 
another group that did not and then to compare their before-and-after levels. Mathemati-
cally, the impact is calculated using the difference between pre- and post- intervention 
mean outcomes for the treatment and control groups and then subtracting the two differ-
ences. 
)()( controlpre
control
post
treat
pre
treat
post YYYYimpact −−−== δ            (6) 
DID addresses the issue of non-random treatment assignment by controlling for inherent 
differences between the two groups. The first difference controls for time-invariant factors 
while the second difference controls for time-varying factors that are the same in both 
treatment and control groups. Thus, selection bias is eliminated due to differencing. In 
other words, this method controls for the unobserved differences between treatment and 
control group as long as their trends do not change over time. But why do the control and 
treatment groups require similar outcome trends? The graphs in Figures 3a to 3d illustrate 
DID and provide the answer.  
The vertical axis in these graphs represents the outcome, and the horizontal axis represents 
time. Figure 3a shows data on individuals in the treatment (T) group before and after in-
tervention. It reveals the ‘naïve’ impact of the intervention on the treatment group, calcu-
lated as a single difference before and after intervention (Ytreatpost - Ytreatpre). It is a ‘naïve’ 
impact since considering only the data before and after the intervention means that time-
varying factors have not been taken into account. Figure 3b presents the difference in post-
intervention ‘naïve’ impact on the treatment and the control group (Ytreatpost – Ycontrolpost). A 
single difference ex post implies that pre-existing differences between the two groups have 
been ignored. Figure 3c shows the combination of the four crucial data points needed for 
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the calculation of DID. The bold line represents the behaviour of the treatment group be-
fore and after intervention, while the normal line below depicts the trend followed by the 
comparison group, again in both the pre- and the post-intervention period. The impact is 
ΔYpost minus ΔYpre. Figure 3d illustrates the manner in which the impact is generated from 
these points. It is important to note that DID assumes that, in the absence of intervention, 
the treatment group would follow the behaviour of the control group over time, as de-
picted by the dotted line. The dotted line represents the true counterfactual outcomes 
which are never observed. If outcome trends are systematically different, bias impact es-
timates will result. 
 
To illustrate this, Figures 3d and 4a show the impact, δ, as the distance between points A 
and B. It shows the outcome of the control and treatment groups moving in the same di-
rection. If the slopes between the two groups are not the same, then it will be difficult to 
capture the true average treatment effect. For instance, if the dotted line between A and B 
in Figure 4b is the true behaviour of the treatment group without intervention, then δ is 
overestimated.  
Figure 3: Graphic illustration of difference-in-difference (DID) 
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Thus, the key assumption with DID is that the treatment and control groups should have 
similar growth rates in outcome. In reality, this assumption between the two groups cannot 
be directly verified. One way to increase the credibility of the results is to have two base-
lines and to check whether trends in both groups prior to the intervention remain stable.  
 
 
Difference-in-differences can also be applied using a simple regression framework. Fol-
lowing Wooldridge (2002), the regression equation takes the form:   
iiiiii ZtTtTY ξθδγβα +++++= )*(                            (7) 
where Ti =1 if the individual belongs to the treatment group, 0 if he belongs to the control 
group.  ti =1 if the individual is observed in the second time period, 0 if he is observed in 
the first period. Ti * ti  if the individual is observed in the treatment group and in the sec-
ond time period. Zi stands for observable characteristics of individual i. The parameter of 
interest is δ, the coefficient of the interaction terms Ti and ti.  
It is easy to assume that DID involves panel data, where the same individuals are tracked 
for both periods or even longer. According to Wooldridge (2002) and Ravallion (2008), 
the DID technique may work even if panel data are not available. It can also be applied 
with pooled cross-section data, as long as the individuals come from the same population 
and additional regressors are used to take individual-level characteristics into account.  
Local capture 
Local capture is considered to be one of the main shortcomings of decentralisation. It 
takes many forms; in some countries it is blatant, in others it is hardly visible and so diffi-
cult to pin down. What can be done to minimise it? In Uganda, there was a growing fear 
that school grants were being captured by local government officials and politicians (at 
district level) responsible for disbursing the funds to schools. In fact, in 1996 it was found 
Figure 4: Illustration of biased DID 
                               Figure 4a                  Figure 4b 
 
  
 
   
 
 
Source:  Author’s representation. 
T
C
DID = δ
   A 
B 
T
C
Y 
Pre Post 
Y
Pre Post 
True  
impact 
B
A
Melody Garcia 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik 28 
that the some schools received only 20 per cent of the funds allocated to them, while oth-
ers, tragically, received none.    
The central government then launched a newspaper campaign in 1997 in which informa-
tion was published on monthly transfers of capitation grants to districts and on how local 
officials had handled the grants programme. The newspaper was circulated to various dis-
tricts, targeting both schools and parents. The aim was to empower the schools and the 
constituents to demand what they were entitled to.  
To determine the impact, Reinikka / Svensson (2004) applied the DID approach to see 
whether access to public information would reduce the capture of school funds by district 
officials. Figure 5 below illustrates the design of their evaluation. The vertical axis repre-
sents the funding10 received by schools and the horizontal axis the time between the be-
ginning and the end of the newspaper campaign. The treatment group consists of schools 
(represented by head teachers) reporting access to at least one newspaper in 2001, the con-
trol group of schools reporting no access to a newspaper in 2001. The four dots represent 
averages for the treatment group and control group in 1995 (229 schools) and 2001 (217 
schools). It should be remembered that a single difference between the treatment and con-
trol groups in 2001 is not the impact, since that difference may be caused by selection bias 
– the inherent differences between the two groups. In addition, a single difference in the 
case of the treatment group between 1995 and 2001 is not the impact, either, since the 
change may have been caused by factors that unfold over time. Impact, as shown below, is 
the widening of the funding gap between the treatment and control groups.  
 
 
                                                 
10  Funding received by schools is calculated as the share of money received by the school from the district 
office and the grants disbursed by the central government for that school. 
Figure 5: Stylised illustration of Reinikka and Svensson (2004) 
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The difference-in-differences estimate shows that schools claimed a significantly larger 
proportion of their grant after the newspaper campaign started. The DID results obtained 
by Reinikka / Svensson (2004) are presented in Table 4. The “access to newspapers” row 
represents the treatment group, “no access to newspapers” the control group. The “access-
no access difference” is the difference between the two groups. The figures are averages 
and the numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The last column and last row show the 
DID estimate. The table reveals that funding received by schools in both the treatment and 
the control group in 1995 was, on average, very meagre. This is a possible indication of 
local capture and corruption. When the newspaper campaign was introduced, funding in-
creased for both groups, with the treatment group receiving higher funding. The DID es-
timate is 13.8 per cent and is significant at 5 per cent. Thus the share of the funding 
received by schools with access to newspapers rose by an average of 13.8 percentage 
points compared with those with no access to newspapers.   
 
 
The important assumption made in the DID model is that, in the absence of intervention, 
the behaviour of the treatment group would be the same as that of the control group over 
time. In their paper, Reinikka and Svensson validated this assumption by conducting ro-
bustness tests. Firstly, they used earlier baseline data to determine whether outcome trends 
change systematically across groups. Secondly, they checked to see if funding shares 
changed when schools differed in other ways. In other words, they were interested in es-
tablishing if the treatment schools had other specific characteristics.   
Although Reinikka / Svensson (2004) tested the plausibility of assuming that the outcome 
trends are similar between control and treatment groups in the DID approach, estimating 
the impact still causes concern. This stems from the endogeneity problems possibly asso-
ciated with access to newspapers. In other words, (i) “there may be some unobserved 
school characteristics correlated with both newspaper access and the efficiency in which 
the school can articulate its case to the district officials,” (ii) “schools (head teachers) 
may be informed about the grant (program) even if it does not have a newspaper if par-
ents in the community where the school is located have access to one,” and (iii) “newspa-
per readership (frequency, time spent, etc.) may vary greatly across schools reporting 
Table 4: Difference-in-differences estimates of the effects on funding of having access to  
 newspapers 
Group Year 
Campaign experiment        
(number of observations: 444) 1995 2001 
2001–1995  
difference 
Access to newspapers 
24.5*** 
(2.87) 
83.7*** 
(1.94) 
59.2*** 
(3.46) 
No access to newspapers 29.6*** 
(5.40) 
75.0*** 
(3.11) 
45.4*** 
(6.22) 
Access-no access difference -5.12 
(6.10) 
8.68** 
(3.66) 
13.8** 
(7.13) 
Source:  Reinikka / Svensson (2004), Table 4. 
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access to at least one newspaper” (Reinikka / Svensson 2004, 13–14). This issue of en-
dogeneity and how to solve it is explained in the next section. 
Oil discovery and corruption 
How does an oil discovery affect governance mechanisms in fragile countries? One theory 
is that countries tend to grow especially slowly if they have a weak institutional frame-
work (Mehlum et al. 2006). But why is this the case? Vicente (2010) explores the effect of 
an oil discovery announced in Sao Tome and Principe, which led to heightened corruption 
among public servants. He used the DID approach to identify the difference between Sao 
Tome and Principe to Cape Verde in corruption perceptions in public services before and 
after the oil discovery. He carried out retrospective household surveys in both island coun-
tries and also asked the respondents questions about their personal histories. His findings 
showed strong evidence of perceived corruption in education and customs, as well as an 
increase in vote-buying.   
As evidenced from these examples, DID is a highly intuitive and flexible method to use. It 
accounts for the unobservable characteristics, due to nonrandom assignment of interven-
tion, as long as they are time-invariant. However, DID may not be plausible in practice if 
baseline data have not been obtained for both treatment and control groups.  
5.2 Instrumental variable approach  
“Doctors are observed to be frequently in the presence of people with fevers, but doc-
tors do not cause the fevers; it is the third variable (the illness) that causes the two 
other variables to correlate (people with fevers and the presence of doctors).”  
       Leeuw and Vaessen (2009) 
The instrumental variable approach (or IV) is a popular technique for addressing (i) selec-
tion bias – when participation in a programme may have been deliberately targeted at cer-
tain groups of individuals – and/or (ii) endogeneity – when the dependent variable affects 
the independent variables owing to unobserved individual differences between the treat-
ment and control groups. The latter occurs, for example, when one group (treated or con-
trol) is more “motivated” than the other. Unlike DID, IV can check for factors that vary 
over time. Solving these problems requires the identification of an instrument (or a vari-
able) that is correlated with the intervention, but not with the outcome. The use of the in-
strument eliminates the endogenous assignment of the treatment or participation. The IV 
approach entails the use of two-stage least squares (2SLS), the first stage involves the re-
gression of endogenous treatment variable T on instrument Z and other exogenous regres-
sors Xi. The second stage involves the regression of outcome Y on predicted treatment Tˆ  
and Xi.  
   εθβα +++= iii XTY                                 (3) 
  Stage 1:  ξπδλ +++= ii XZT                                  (4) 
  Stage 2:  εθβα +++= iii XTY )ˆ(                              (5) 
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The IV estimator (or parameter β) is a consistent estimate of the average treatment effect 
on the treated and is expressed as ),(/),( ZTCovZYCov=β . The main problem with the 
IV approach is the difficulty of identifying the instrument. Its validity hinges on the use of 
good instruments, instruments that are closely correlated with the treatment and do not 
affect the outcome. Weak instruments may exacerbate the bias and lead to incorrect infer-
ences (Glazerman et al. 2003; Ravallion 2008).11  
Local capture, continued 
Returning to the problems identified by Reinikka / Svensson (2004) and discussed in the 
previous section, the authors adopted an IV approach to determine how the impact would 
evolve if access to newspapers was considered endogenous. In doing so, they needed to 
identify an instrument that affected exposure to the newspaper campaign, but should not 
be directly correlated with the ‘ability to claim funds from the district.’ They identified the 
third variable (Z) as the distance between the nearest newspaper outlet and the schools. 
This variable was chosen because distance captured the ‘cost and ease of accessing a 
newspaper.’  
In the first stage, they regressed the head teachers’ knowledge of the distance from the 
nearest newspaper outlet (the instrument). The teachers’ knowledge was proxied by the 
aggregate score achieved by the teachers in questions put to them. The test consisted of 
questions on the formula used to arrive at the capitation grant and the timing of disburse-
ments. They found that teachers in schools closer to newspaper outlets knew more about 
the grant programme and the timing of disbursements. In the second stage, they regressed 
the grants received by the schools on the predicted teachers’ knowledge, the post-
intervention year, the interaction of these two variables and income.12 The result shows 
that schools exposed to newspapers, or ‘more informed schools,’ increased their funding 
by 44.2 percentage points between 1995 and 2001. The result lends credibility to the pre-
vious finding generated by DID.  
But how do we know if the distance from the newspaper outlet is a legitimate instrument? 
It should be noted that this instrument must affect the head teacher’s knowledge of the 
grant as a result of increased access to newspapers, but not the funds he claims. The au-
thors conducted several tests: 
• To check that distance correlated with access to newspapers, they undertook a regres-
sion to show that the relationship between distance and access to newspapers was 
negative and significant, meaning that the shorter the distance from the outlet, the 
greater the access to newspapers. This suggests that proximity to newspapers in-
creased head teachers’ knowledge of the grant programme.    
• To verify that the head teachers in the treatment group were not more knowledgeable 
than those in the control group (and so better able to claim funds), they were subjected 
to a written test to compare their general knowledge of politics and public affairs. The 
results show that distance from the nearest newspaper does not correlate with the head 
teachers’ test scores in terms of general knowledge.  
                                                 
11  Weak instruments can be verified using the test of overidentifying restrictions. See Wooldridge (2009) 
for detailed explanation. 
12  The structural regression is: schoolshare = f(teacher, 2001, teacher* 2001, income). 
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Overall, these tests show that the instrument correlates closely with the endogenous vari-
able (teacher’s knowledge of grants), but not with the outcome (funding).  
Voting behaviour 
Why do citizens need to vote? The simple answer is that government decisions have a 
direct impact on each individual and the community as a whole. Voting gives individuals 
the power to choose and to express their opinions. It is an essential process in the promo-
tion of democracy. For a variety of reasons, voter turnout and political participation have 
continued to decline in established democracies in recent decades (Niemi / Weisberg 
2001). What could be done to rekindle the enthusiasm of voters? Can voter mobilisation 
campaigns do the job?  
Arceneaux et al. (2006) studied the impact of a “large-scale voter mobilisation experi-
ment” in Iowa and Michigan before the 2002 mid-term elections. The treatment consisted 
of “get-out-the-vote” phone calls encouraging citizens to vote and reminding them of the 
election date. Voters were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups.13 Those in 
the control group did not receive any calls. Since some individuals in the treatment group 
refused to listen to the message or did not answer the calls, only 41.8 per cent received 
treatment. The failure to administer the intervention to a fraction of individuals assigned to 
the treatment group created a selection problem.  
As not everyone assigned to the treatment group received the message, an instrumental 
variable regression (2SLS) was employed. The authors exploited the characteristics of 
their data, distinguishing cases where individuals were actually treated from those as-
signed to the treatment group. Thus the endogenous treatment variable, T, is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the individual received the treatment, while the instrument is a 
dummy variable, Z, equal to 1 if the individual is assigned to the treatment group.  
After the election, the voting data on each individual were collected to see whether the 
treatment had been effective. The first stage of regression involves regressing treatment 
assignment T with instrument Z. The second stage involves regressing the outcome vari-
able (dummy equals one if the individual voted in 2002) with the predicted T and covari-
ates. Interestingly, the authors found that get-out-the-vote phone calls did not increase 
voter turnout. 
Crime 
In the third example the question is how best to reduce crime. Donors often make substan-
tial investments in police training in developing countries. But whether the police can ef-
fectively reduce crime is still an open question, since studies on its effect show conflicting 
conclusions.  
Studying the effect of police on crime is plagued with endogeneity problem, since in-
creases in crime are likely to induce the government to recruit more police officers. Hence 
it is not clear which one affects the other. Most cross-sectional studies found that the po-
                                                 
13  In detail, the two states are composed of districts which were divided into two groups: competitive and 
uncompetitive. Within each group, households with two or more registered voters were randomly as-
signed to treatment and control groups. Only one person per household was selected.  
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lice had no impact on crime (Cameron 1988), while studies addressing the specification 
issue more carefully (that there is reverse causality between policemen and crime) identi-
fied a substantial, negative impact (Corman / Mocan 2000; Levitt 1997; Marvell / Moody 
1996). In his contribution to this debate, Levitt (2002) identifies the impact of the police 
on crime using annual, city-level panels covering the period 1975-1995 in 59 large US 
cities. He proposes the number of firefighters per capita as the instrument, since firefight-
ers and police officers are highly correlated over time and there is little reason to believe 
that firefighters have a direct impact on crime. He acknowledges, however, that the latter 
assumption may be questioned. He found that the police reduce violent and property 
crimes.  
Overall, these examples illustrate that the IV approach is useful if programme placement is 
non-random and the data exhibit endogeneity. IV can check for both observable and unob-
servable characteristics as long as the available instrument is found. And unlike DID, IV 
can control for time-varying selection bias.  
5.3 Propensity score matching (PSM) 
If a given governance intervention starts without the treatment being allocated randomly, 
individuals who receive treatment can be matched with one or more individuals who have 
not received treatment on the basis of some observable characteristics. This is the essence 
of PSM. Reverting to the police and corruption story in the previous section as an exam-
ple, the TEA has selected several policemen to join the quota programme (the treatment 
group). It should be noted that, in this case, the TEA has conducted the intervention with-
out randomly assigning the treatment. It is possible that the TEA chooses only those po-
licemen who volunteer or who happen to be deliberately assigned. And as the president 
suggested, it has also included policemen who did not participate in the programme as a 
control group. The problem here is that the TEA cannot just select any policemen who did 
not participate in the programme, since those who participated may be inherently different 
from those who did not. Thus, to ensure that the two groups do not differ systematically 
across various observable characteristics (gender, income, family size, etc.), matching is 
required. Matching one characteristic, such as gender, of all policemen in the treatment 
group with that of one or more policemen in the control group is relatively easy, but 
matching ten characteristics of one policeman in the treatment group with those of one or 
a hundred policemen in the control group is a time-consuming exercise. Furthermore, an 
exact match of a huge number of characteristics of individuals is virtually impossible. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) therefore recommended matching based on a propensity 
score. This means that matching is based on the probability that the individual will partici-
pate in the programme.  
)|Pr()(Pr XTreatmentXopensity i =  
Propensity score matching eliminates selection bias by pooling individuals from the con-
trol group who have similar characteristics to those of the treatment group. The objective 
is to increase the similarity of participants and non-participants in the programme. The 
counterfactuals are the non-participants with characteristics similar to those of the partici-
pants.  
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Some caveats are necessary: first, implementing PSM requires a rich set of control vari-
ables and comparable surveys of treated and control groups. Second, matching is based on 
observable characteristics, not on unobservables – behaviour that cannot be observed 
and/or measured, such as motivation and enthusiasm. The key assumption in PSM is 
therefore that there is no selection bias due to unobservable characteristics or that partici-
pation is independent of outcomes.14  
As the propensity score is a continuous variable, the probability of obtaining two similar 
scores from individuals in the treatment and control groups is infinitely small. Conse-
quently, various algorithms have been invented in which propensity scores of the treat-
ment and control observations are selected and matched on the basis of some tolerance 
level, weights, strata or neighbourhood. There is no superior algorithm. The selection of 
the algorithm is a trade off between bias and efficiency. Considering more than one algo-
rithm together can provide a robustness check on the estimates. PSM proceeds in the 
following stages:15 
1. Collect comparable surveys of treated and control groups. 
2. Pool the samples and estimate the probit of programme participation.  
3. Restrict samples to ensure area of common support. Common support ensures that the 
characteristics in the treatment groups are similarly observed as in the control group 
(see Figure 6) 
4. Choose matching algorithms. 
5. For each treated individual find controls with similar propensity scores.  
6. Calculate the increase/decrease in outcome for that observation. 
7. Calculate the average of the individual results to obtain impact. 
8. Carry out a sensitivity analysis using Rosenbaum or MH bounds. 
Transparency 
An example of its application has been done to determine whether transparency of gov-
ernment performance motivates people to participate or engage in civic activities. In many 
countries, donors actively participated in developing performance benchmarks for local 
government at the height of decentralisation. One of the most popular is the Citizens Re-
port Card in India, Bangladesh and Mexico. In the Philippines, the Report Card Survey is 
just one of 30 different performance assessment systems funded by donor agencies. Most 
of these systems are aimed at improving public service delivery and welfare. However, 
public service delivery can be improved only if people become more active members of 
the community. Anecdotal evidence has provided some clues to the effectiveness of these 
measures. But a causal link between information on local government performance and 
civic participation is yet to be established.   
                                                 
14  The Rosenbaum and MH bounds are tests that can provide some indication of the validity of this as-
sumption, although it cannot be directly tested. See Becker / Caliendo (2007). 
15  See Caliendo / Kopeinig (2008) and Becker / Ichino (2002) for more discussion on matching algorithms 
and practical guidance. 
Micro-methods in evaluating governance interventions 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik 35
Capuno / Garcia (2010) investigate the effect of information concerning the performance 
of local government officials on people’s participation during decentralisation in the Phil-
ippines. A local governance performance index was introduced in 12 cities and munici-
palities. At the eight treatment sites, the index scores were announced by means of public 
presentations, posters, magazines and stickers, while the index scores were not announced 
at the four control sites. Since not all individuals in the treatment municipalities receive 
treatment, there is reason to suspect selection bias. Propensity score matching is therefore 
used to match individuals who actually received treatment (in the treatment municipali-
ties) with those in the control municipalities.   
 
Figure 6: Region of common support 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Author’s representation. 
The data were derived from three rounds of random household surveys conducted at all 
the pilot sites. At the eight treatment sites, 178 individuals reported exposure to the treat-
ment – 95 in the 2002 mid-pilot survey and 83 in the 2003 post-pilot survey. The treated 
individuals were those who had read the magazines, seen the posters or attended the public 
presentation. There were three comparison groups: (i) 400 individuals from the four con-
trol municipalities in 2002, (ii) 400 individuals from the four control municipalities in 
2003 and (iii) 800 individuals in the two years combined. A number of individual and vil-
lage-level characteristics, including gender, age, schooling, income, family size, employ-
ment and civil status, were used to determine participation. For each comparison group, 
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• The 95 individuals in the treatment group were matched with the 400 individuals in 
the control group in 2002 using various matching algorithms.16 Similarly, the 83 
treated individuals in 2003 were compared with the 400 individuals in the control 
group for the same year. On the assumption that there were no time-varying factors 
that might affect the outcome, the combined number of treated individuals in 2002 
and 2003 (178) were matched with 800 individuals in the control group in the com-
bined years. Some individuals who had very few characteristics in common with the 
others were dropped, thus restricting the sample to individuals in both the treatment 
and the control group who shared an overlap. This is also known as the region of 
common support. It ensures that the characteristics observed in the treatment groups 
are the same as those in the control group (see Figure 6).  
After the sample had been restricted, one or more control individuals were matched with 
each treated individual. Assuming one-to-one matching as illustrated in Figure 7, this im-
plies that one individual in the treatment group will be matched with one in the control 
group who has the closest propensity score. The difference between the two individuals’ 
outcomes was calculated. After this procedure had been repeated for all individuals in the 
restricted sample until all treated individuals were matched, the impact was calculated 
from the average difference in the outcomes of the treated and control units.  
 
 
Deliberation 
Deliberation is a venue for individuals to express a wide range of views and is considered 
a crucial component of the democratic process. It builds knowledge based on the argu-
ments presented by participants so that a sound judgement or decision may be made. But 
whether deliberation can in fact increase learning is an empirical question.  
Barabas (2004) employed propensity score matching to assess the effect of people’s delib-
erations on social security reform in the United States. A large “deliberative forum” on 
                                                 
16  Matching algorithms used are nearest 1-to-1, nearest neighbour, kernel, radius and stratification. See 
Becker and Ichino (2002) for a description.   
Figure 7: One-to-one matching, stylised example 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Author’s representation. 
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possible social security reforms was carried out to see whether participants’ learning 
would increase and whether their opinions would change. Participants were provided with 
information materials before the forum. During the forum, the organisers reiterated the 
importance of having an open mind and of abandoning strongly held views. Four hundred 
and eight citizens from a random sample of registered voters in the county of Maricopa 
participated. Invitations to participate were also publicised locally in the media and on the 
internet. Participants in the treatment group were those who attended the forum (or forum 
group), and the control groups were (i) those who were invited but did not attend and (ii) a 
random sample of people in the county. Because assignment to treatment and control 
groups was non-random, it is difficult to tell why some citizens participated and others did 
not. To overcome this problem, the author employed PSM to match the forum and control 
groups. To determine whether deliberation had changed the knowledge and opinions of 
the participants, Barabas calculated the net effect as the ‘difference between the pre- and 
post-forum survey measures for the group that attended the deliberative forum subtracted 
from the difference in the pre- and post-forum scores of the matched comparison group 
members.’ He found that deliberation increases knowledge and can change opinions on 
condition that the information provided is of good quality and participants have diverse 
views and an open mind. 
Unlike DID, PSM does not require baseline data. The impact is calculated based on a sin-
gle difference of outcome after the intervention. The main drawback of this approach is 
the difficulty in justifying that selection bias on unobservables is small enough to have any 
effect on the impact estimate. On a more practical note, PSM can also be computationally 
challenging. 
5.4 Regression discontinuity design (RDD) 
Some donor programmes target groups of individuals on the basis of certain eligibility 
criteria (such as test scores, age or poverty index). Individuals below a certain cut-off re-
ceive the treatment and those above it do not. This division automatically generates the 
treatment and control groups. , The characteristics of individuals in the neighbourhood of 
the eligibility cut-off should be more or less the same except for, say, income (in the case 
of the poverty index). Since individuals are considered homogeneous in this subset, RDD 
checks for both observed and unobserved individual characteristics. Thus, to some extent, 
the closest approximation to randomisation in producing unbiased estimates is achieved 
with RDD (Rossi / Freeman 1993). Finally, the impact is calculated through a comparison 
of the shift between pre-treatment and post-treatment outcomes at the cut-off.17  
If we consider an election education campaign that seeks to increase the probability of 
registration and assume that this intervention targets participants on the basis of a poverty 
indicator, those below the cut-off level Z will receive the treatment and those above that 
level will not (see Figure 8a). Along the eligibility cut-off, there is no reason to believe 
that individuals are different except for their incomes. Figure 8a illustrates the outcome 
(Y) for individuals below and above the poverty cut-off (Z). Those who are below the cut-
off are participants in the programme and those above it are not (the control group). Figure 
                                                 
17  The RDD approach requires that the eligibility criterion is continuous and adhered to consistently, i. e. 
participants should not be able to manipulate their assignment to either treatment or control group.   
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8b shows the discontinuity in the regression line of the targeted group after the informa-
tion campaign.  
Along the boundary Z, impact, or the local average treatment effect is derived. This is cal-
culated by taking the outcome of individuals who are at the boundaries – i. e., who are 
marginally below and above the cut-off point. The estimate is assumed to be free of selec-
tion bias, both observable and unobservable, since individuals would tend to exhibit simi-
lar characteristics along the boundaries of this cut-off.  
 
 
Local spending 
Do local governments spend more under representative democracy than direct democracy? 
Are there policy consequences from opting one than the other? The debate on the virtues 
of direct democracy – as providing citizens with great amount of participation in the legis-
lative processes to that of representative democracy, where rights are transferred to group 
of people, persists as strong as ever.  
To contribute to this debate, Pettersson-Lidbom / Tyrefors (2007) analysed the effects of 
direct and representative democracy on per capita spending of local government in Swe-
den using pooled cross-section data from 1930 to 1950. Whether localities adopt direct or 
representative democracy is highly dependent on their population size. The cut-off popula-
tion size is mandated by law. From 1919 to 1938, municipalities with a population of 
1,501 or more were required to have representative democracy. In 1938, the population 
cut-off was reduced to 701. Municipalities falling below the cut-off could choose either 
direct or representative democracy. Because the nature of the data allows those who are 
below the cut-off to choose, eligibility rules are not strictly followed. To circumvent this 
problem, a variation of RDD design called “fuzzy discontinuity” has been applied. With 
fuzzy discontinuities, the average local treatment effect is the ratio of the difference in 
Figure 8: Regression discontinuity design: an illustration 
 Figure 8a     Figure 8b 
 Before treatment      After treatment 
 
 
 
        
  
 
Source:  Author’s representation. 
Y 
Z
       + + + + +    
+ ++ ++ ++ +  + 
     + + +   +  + xx    
++     +  +   + +    x 
++ + +  +   +     x x   
+ ++     +             x  
+ ++  +  +       
 + +    
     x x x x x          x   
x xx xx xx x  
     x x x   x  x    
x            x x x x 
       x   xx   xxx   x    
xx     x xxxx 
   x x x     x  xxxx  
xxx 
    x       xxx    
    
20  +  
Z
Y
         
           
               ++ + 
  +++ +++ +++xx 
     + + +   +  + xx     
          +  +   + x x 
  ++ + +  + ++x x   
+ ++ + + +  +    x     
 + ++  +++ xx    
+   + ++  +  +       
+  + 
  
x         x     x xx xx    
x    xxx  x xx x   xxx 
xx xx    xxxxx x x 
xxx xxx xx xx xxx 
xxx x x   x 
xx x   x 
x xx 
40
Micro-methods in evaluating governance interventions 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik 39
mean outcomes above and below the cut-off to the difference between the mean treatment 
status of eligible individuals and ineligible individuals. In this example, the authors used 
the ratio of the difference in spending to the difference in the probability of treatment. Ac-
cording to their preliminary RDD results, local government spends less under direct de-
mocracy than representative democracy.    
Social assistance 
RDD has been widely applied in labour market studies, but not many studies can be found 
in the governance realm. To illustrate RDD further, one of the many labour market studies 
is taken as an example. The study links the working behaviour of citizens to the social 
assistance provided by government.  
Governments are always keen to strike a balance between social benefits and disincentives 
to work. This is evidenced by a series of labour market reforms in the USA, Canada and 
Europe. Analysing the impact of reforms is challenging owing to macroeconomic changes 
that alter the demand for labour, as well as isolating the effects of other policies (Blank 
2002). Lemieux / Milligan (2008) analysed the impact of a policy in the province of Que-
bec, which provides less social assistance for childless individuals under age 30 than re-
cipients over 30. The policy break at age 30 provided a natural opportunity to analyse the 
impact of welfare payments using RDD. By using RDD, the authors were able to circum-
vent the problems mentioned above. First, by exploiting the discontinuity in a static pol-
icy, they were able to ensure that no other reforms contaminated the evaluation of the low-
benefit policy. Second, no assumptions were needed regarding the comparability of the 
treatment and control groups, even when the economic environment changed, since, the 
two groups should be more or less identical, except for their age, where the discontinuity 
occurs. The average local treatment effect is simply the difference between outcomes be-
low and above the cut-off within a certain range. Using census data, the authors found 
strong evidence of generous social benefits having a negative impact on employment.     
These examples show that, as average treatment effects are calculated at the boundary, 
some concerns need to be addressed when RDD is applied: 
• First, the result may not always be true for the entire population.  
• Second, it is questionable whether the observations at the cut-off would be of interest 
to policymakers.  
• Third, the units of observation at the boundary may be too few in number, which 
could make it difficult to arrive at a robust inference.  
• Lastly, but more generally, strict adherence to the cut-off should be ensured, meaning 
that individuals should not be able to influence their assignment above or below the 
cut-off whenever they choose.   
5.5 Combining techniques  
Depending on the nature of the data, two impact evaluation techniques are usually com-
bined to increase the accuracy of the impact estimate. This may minimise an identified 
cause of bias that one approach cannot altogether eliminate. In the previous example of 
local capture (see sections 5.1 and 5.2), Reinikka / Svensson (2005) combined the DID 
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and IV approaches in studying the effect of a newspaper campaign on corruption in 
Uganda. As previously shown, the authors used DID in calculating the impact of the pro-
gramme. But because they suspected endogeneity in programme participation, IV was 
used to solve the problem and confirmed the positive results.  
Apart from using RDD in analysing the effects of social insurance on employment,  
Lemieux / Milligan (2008) also employed DID to check the results obtained with RDD. 
They have utilized data after the cancellation of the low benefit policy. The cancellation 
has produced a pre and post comparison for both treatment and control groups. They 
found that DID does not perform well if the control groups used do not come from the 
same area. This implies that, in this context, the DID results could not take broader eco-
nomic changes into account.  
More examples of evaluation not related to governance, but routinely carried out in the 
various sectors, include the combination of PSM/DID and of DID/RDD.18 Specifically, 
Ravallion / Chen (2005) assessed the impact of the Southwest China Poverty Reduction 
Project on household saving and consumption behaviour in rural villages. They used PSM 
to match villages, so that initial heterogeneity in the treatment and control villages could 
be removed. They then applied DID to the matched villages. This technique is used to 
increase the precision of impact estimates, especially in cases where changes over time are 
dependent on initial conditions. Further programme placement is also based on these base-
line characteristics and is typically not randomly assigned (Jalan / Ravallion 1998; 
Ravallion 2008).  
Another technique is the combination of DID and RDD undertaken by Jacob / Lefgren 
(2004) in education. They evaluated whether the school remedial measures, such as sum-
mer schools have an impact on a student’s future achievement. They used the test scores 
as eligibility criteria and a DID estimator to determine the gain above and below the cut-
off score as well as the gain before and after.  
5.6 Other evaluation approaches  
Other methods can also be applied to evaluate programme impact. Some of these tech-
niques include quantile regressions and general equilibrium analysis. Quantile regression 
involves analyzing the effect of the program across distribution of outcomes. Even if the 
average impact of the programme is zero, policymakers are often interested in how the 
outcomes vary for specific groups of targeted individuals or households. General equilib-
rium analysis is useful when it comes to assessing the effect of a certain policy change. It 
models the effects of macroeconomic policies and even economic shocks on households or 
firms. Such modelling is often very complex and requires many identifying assumptions. 
In both techniques, how the programme was implemented remains an important factor in 
the analysis since selection bias must always be taken into account. This is beyond the 
scope of this paper, but reference can be made to Khandker et al. (2010) for a detailed 
explanation. 
                                                 
18  Due to the limited impact evaluation studies in the governance area, examples from other sectors are 
also presented to illustrate how the combination of techniques can be performed.   
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5.7 Which technique to use? 
Now that the various evaluation designs have been presented, the question of when one 
technique is more appropriate than another remains. There is no quick and easy answer to 
this question. And typically, there is no definitive approach to choosing the best evaluation 
technique. Each method has its own particular requirements, advantages and disadvan-
tages.  
To a certain extent evaluators must rely on their own judgment to strike the right balance. 
However, going back to programme theory helps a great deal to identify potential meth-
ods, since a policy intervention is almost always case-specific and, in some respect, 
unique. Its design varies with the beneficiaries of the programme and the socio-economic 
characteristics of the population. Such peculiarities must therefore be addressed in the 
research design.  
Nonetheless, a rough classification of the applicability of the methods discussed in this 
paper is possible: the toolbox below (see Table 5) is a simple guide to determine when 
each quantitative method can be used, where it has been applied and what are the key re-
quirements, advantages and disadvantages.  
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6 Tackling the difficulties 
Impact evaluation in governance shares many of the challenges and data constraints of 
other development programmes. The previous chapter considered the ideal situation where 
sample sizes are large, no spillovers occur, the unit of analysis in most cases is the indi-
vidual, the interventions are clear-cut and can be manipulated, outcome measure is 
straightforward, and there is room to collect control groups. What happens if an interven-
tion does not correspond to this ideal situation? This problem is not new in the evaluation 
literature. Considerable experience has been accumulated in such heavily evaluated sec-
tors as labour, education and health, showing how to tackle some of the challenges that 
arise when not all requirements are met or not all assumptions prove correct. 
The aim of this chapter is to compile a list of some of the difficult points and issues arising 
in the evaluation of governance programmes. In most cases, the solutions are variations on 
the standard techniques discussed earlier. The possible solutions are discussed in detail 
and draw on cases in sectors other than governance, since examples of impact evaluation 
of governance are relatively few in number.  
6.1 Measuring outcome 
An important obstacle encountered in the evaluation of governance interventions is quanti-
fying outcome that is largely characterised by human behaviour and difficult to pin down. 
Unlike some development programmes, there is no easy or straightforward measure of 
governance outcomes. For impact studies in the traditional sectors, the measure of out-
comes can be defined and is not as controversial. For instance, the effects of education on 
labour are captured by wages and employment; nutritional improvements are measured by 
such anthropometric indicators as weight, height and body mass index; and the effective-
ness of fertilisers is measured by farm yield. But what is the best way to capture a decline 
in corruption? Or an increase in civic participation? Or an improvement in law enforce-
ment? 
It is important to acknowledge that governance outcomes cannot be measured with a sin-
gle, all-encompassing indicator. The practical approach would be to unpack the interven-
tion and assess which of its dimensions can be rigorously analysed. Although measuring 
outcome is a challenging task, some authors have been very creative in solving this prob-
lem. A very good example is the randomised experiment conducted by Olken (2007), 
which was discussed in an earlier chapter of this paper. Instead of using a perception-
based corruption measure as the outcome variable, he devised a direct measure of corrup-
tion: the difference between reported expenditure and an independent engineer’s estimate. 
Other studies also use creative outcome measures. Table 6 presents the outcome measures 
used in the selected governance interventions discussed in this paper.  
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6.2 Small sample size 
A common problem encountered in the evaluation of governance interventions (especially 
at higher levels of government) is that the units of observation are often too few for the 
assumptions associated with parametric statistics to hold. In other words, the accuracy of 
the inferences based on the methods described hinges on statistical “laws” that require a 
large sample size (central limit theorem). The methods presented in the last chapter typi-
cally have large sample sizes. That is, sufficient cases or observations are collected from 
the treatment and control groups. Deviating from the large sample size requirement is of-
ten inevitable in some governance programmes. There are some alternative approaches to 
dealing with sample sizes.  
First, in cases where the sample has moderate size (say 20 observations), the importance 
of obtaining baseline data must be emphasized in this context. Remember that when ran-
domizing, as sample size increases, the different characteristics between the treatment and 
control groups would cancel out and the remaining difference would only be the interven-
tion. If sample size is of moderate size, this means that the comparison group may not be 
very similar to the treatment. Thus, the more pre- and post treatment data available, the 
more credible the impact estimate could be. Fewer observations also imply that collecting 
more than just one pre-treatment set of data is logistically easier than where samples are 
larger.  
Second, if randomisation is possible, a technique known as “repeated measures” can 
sometimes be used. “Repeated measures” means that baseline data and post-treatment out-
comes will be collected repeatedly for each unit over a period of time. Imagine a country 
with ten provinces in which a programme is to be implemented. After the baseline data 
have been obtained, the programme can be gradually “phased in” in at least one of the 
provinces for a certain period (say six months), with the others used as controls (NRC 
2008). Repeating this process until only one control observation is left will produce a total 
of 10 pre- and at least 10 post-treatment controls. Considering the uniformity of the treat-
ment effects across provinces already enables the reliability of the impact estimate to be 
gauged. Although the estimated effect may still be biased because some confounding fac-
tor has not been taken into account, it may nevertheless allow some inference as to the 
effectiveness of the programme.   
Third, in the case of very small sample size, the evaluation needs to conform to a more 
qualitative approach. In case of non-random assignment of treatment, instead of using 
propensity score in matching of the control or treatment groups, one can match qualita-
tively as accurately as possible the key factors that are important in affecting outcome. 
Again, collection of baseline data is highly advisable. 
In the case of N=1, i. e. when there is only one treated unit and no controls, pre- and post-
treatment information must again be underscored. The frequency with which the data are 
collected before and after the intervention is crucial for the calculation of the impact esti-
mate. If the intervention can be implemented at the time when external factors could be 
expected to be least important, then confounding factors may be minimised. However, it is 
difficult to predict an event or a sudden policy change that may affect the outcome. 
Greater efforts should therefore be made to collect qualitative data and conduct interviews/ 
stakeholder analyses. 
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6.3 No baseline data 
Collecting baseline data or pre-intervention information is a challenging task for develop-
ment practitioners, since (i) interventions may tend to change over time; (ii) all potential 
outcomes – expected and unexpected – must be taken into account at the outset; (iii) col-
lecting baseline data requires additional financial resources; and (iv) the implementation 
of the project could be delayed. Those who are to collect baseline data must have an over-
all idea about how the project will be evaluated later on. Otherwise, the baseline data col-
lected may be insufficient or no longer relevant at the time of evaluation.   
If baseline data are not available, using a triple-difference (DDD) method is an option un-
der certain conditions. Ravallion et al. (2005) adopted this approach for the Trabajar pro-
gramme in Argentina, which provides work for the unemployed poor for six months. They 
examined the difference in the incomes of participants who had left and participants who 
had remained in the programme. A simple DD between “stayers” and “leavers” would 
lead to biased results, since work opportunities are not the same for both groups. Ravallion 
et al. therefore formed an entirely separate control group who had never participated in the 
programme. DDD is the DD of stayers with matched non-participants minus the DD of 
leavers with matched non-participants. The result is the income gained by stayers for par-
ticipating in the program. DDD technique has allowed changes in the economy or labour 
market to be controlled for.    
Another possible approach if no baseline data are available is to reconstruct a baseline in 
retrospect, a practice common to many clinical studies. However, the accuracy of recall, 
i. e. collecting data from individuals’ recollections of what happened a year or more ear-
lier, is a serious problem in this type of study.  
As discussed above, some quasi-experimental techniques, namely single difference (con-
trol versus treatment group) approaches such as PSM or instrumental variable techniques, 
can be applied even in the absence of baseline data.  
6.4 Spillovers and contamination 
Spillovers and contamination occur when treating an individual or group of individuals 
affects the behaviour of individuals who are not in the programme (that serve as controls).  
This is one of the most difficult issues in governance evaluation. For instance, the central 
government has randomly conducted a performance assessment to municipalities. In 
preparation for the next wave of assessment, municipalities in the control groups started 
improving their public service delivery than they would normally do. It is then possible 
that an intervention implemented in one municipality may have unintended impacts on 
others. If that is the case, the true impact may not be captured as control groups are con-
taminated and pure with-and-without comparisons cannot be performed. 
Miguel / Kremer (2004) present an example of how contamination has been controlled for 
in the design of the evaluation in the context of child schooling. Earlier medical findings 
show that deworming drugs have an insignificant effect on the health and school atten-
dance of young children (Dickson et al. 2000). However, Miguel and Kremer believe that 
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this result is underestimated. They argue that the effect of the deworming drugs is greater 
than what the earlier findings claim, since young children belonging to the control group 
and attend the same school as the children in the treatment group may also benefit from 
the positive effects of the treatment (low possibility of disease transmission or fewer infec-
tions). The contamination happens because the treatment is randomised at the individual 
level and positive spillovers can easily occur between the treatment and the control group. 
Thus, in order to circumvent contamination from their experiment, they randomised at 
school level. Randomising at school level means that all children in the selected schools 
receive deworming drugs, while children in the control schools do not. This is in contrast 
to individual-level randomisation, where both treated and untreated children attend the 
same school. This approach should help to minimise the spillover effects of the deworm-
ing drugs. Miguel / Kremer (2004) also identified cross-externalities in neighbouring 
schools, where control schools benefited from treatment schools. They found that de-
worming reduced absenteeism in treatment schools by 25 per cent. But it also improved 
health and school attendance among untreated children in the control and neighbouring 
schools. It is easy to imagine how spillovers can occur in governance, and this example 
describes an excellent approach to tackling this problem.  
6.5 Evaluating higher levels of government 
In clinical trials and experiments with new drugs, randomisation is often conducted at in-
dividual level. However, where the governance agenda is concerned, interest focuses on 
information obtained not only on the individual citizen but also on government units. 
Randomisation at city or provincial rather than individual level requires clustered ran-
domisation. The clusters might consist of such geographical entities as cities, communities 
and provinces or states. This kind of randomisation is sometimes easier and may preclude 
contamination. Clustered randomisation ideally requires more clusters (and sometimes 
more individuals within each cluster) to take inter-cluster variations into account, so that a 
given power may be achieved (Duflo et al. 2007). The power of a test is the probability of 
a programme having a significant effect, provided that there is truly an effect. Increasing 
the sample size increases this power. Thus, in clustered randomisation, increasing the 
number of clusters increases the validity of the experiment.  
If the number of clusters is small, arranging them in matched pairs is a common strategy. 
This means that clusters from treatment and control groups are matched one-to-one. The 
matching is based on factors believed to be correlated with outcome. This allows better 
comparability between treatment and control groups and reduces variation across clusters. 
Hayes / Bennett (1999) illustrate a simple way of calculating the appropriate number of 
clusters for cluster randomisation. They present a method of choosing the sample size for 
both unmatched and matched pair trials.  
Chattopadhyay / Duflo (2004) conducted randomisation at Gram Panchayat (GP) level in 
their study on the impact of women’s leadership on policy decisions in India. A GP is 
composed of 5 to 15 villages of about 10,000 inhabitants. Treatment was assigned at GP 
level, since it was not possible at village level. As the unit of analysis is the village, stan-
dard errors in the authors’ regression analyses were corrected for clustering at GP level. 
They found that mandated representation does have an effect on policymaking and that 
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women leaders (occupying the special seats reserved for them) invest in public goods 
about which they are concerned. 
Glewwe et al. (2009) adopted a randomised evaluation approach in rural Kenyan primary 
schools. They studied the effect of textbook provision on student test scores and found that 
textbooks increased the test scores of only the best students, having no effect on average 
students. The level of randomisation was the school, but the data used in analysing the 
effectiveness of textbook were collected at the level of the individual student.  
6.6 Complex governance interventions 
Sometimes policymakers are interested in not one but a range of policy interventions. In 
conducting RCTs, one or a combination of treatments can be accommodated with factorial 
design. Factorial design is simply an experimental design that allows each treatment, say 
A, B and C, to be combined to produce A, B, C, A+B, A+C, B+C, C+A and A+B+C. This 
means that various treatments can be tested in a single experiment, thus reducing evalua-
tion costs. Factorial design can also investigate the interaction effects of treatment. How-
ever, sample size must be adjusted significantly, depending on the number of interventions 
to be examined. An example of this factorial design is taken from the study of corruption 
in the issue of driving licences discussed earlier, which was conducted by Bertrand et al. 
(2007). They recruited and randomly assigned applicants to three groups: (i) a comparison 
group (ii) applicants offered cash bonuses if they could obtain their licences within 32 
days and (iii) a group offered free driving lessons. This allowed the authors to make com-
parative assessments of the various types of intervention.  
Complex interventions also mean that, as a whole, the programme combines several inputs 
and conditions. It is sometimes difficult to isolate the effect of one input from the effect of 
another. One example of a complex programme that combines cash transfers, condition-
ality and incentives (Duflo et al. 2007) is the Mexican educational programme known as 
PROGRESA (subsequently renamed Oportunidades). This programme involves the offer 
of cash transfers to mothers on condition that their children attend school and visit health 
centres. The primary aim of PROGRESA is to prevent the intergenerational transmission 
of poverty through investment in human capital. How, then, can cash transfers and condi-
tionality be evaluated? 
Using data on PROGRESA, Handa et al. (2009) evaluated the impact of conditionality and 
of cash transfers directly to women on their spending behaviour. In contrast to previous 
evaluations that attested to the significant and positive impacts of PROGRESA on various 
educational and health outcomes (Dubois et al. 2002; Schultz 2004), Handa et al. (2009) 
focused their study on the effects of conditionality and gender targeting to determine 
whether their inclusion in cash transfer programmes was logical.  
As the RCT method has been applied to PROGRESA, evaluating conditionality and trans-
fer income is straightforward. No computationally challenging task needs to be performed. 
To test the effectiveness of conditionality, Handa et al. (2009) simply looked into the 
spending behaviour of households. They expected the transfer income to be spent primar-
ily on schooling or children’s clothing, since that was directly associated with the condi-
tionality. They found, however, that the transfer income was used like earned income, 
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indicating that it was not spent on human capital investment any more than earned income. 
Conditionality was therefore ineffective. As regards the targeting of women for the cash 
transfer, they found that it did not significantly contribute to overall decision-making by 
women. These examples show that even complex interventions can be rigorously evalu-
ated as long as key evaluation requirements have been embedded in the design of the pro-
gramme.   
6.7 Intervention is full coverage 
A difficult scenario that often arises in the evaluation of governance interventions is one in 
which policies and programmes apply to all constituencies – examples being new reforms, 
the passage of new legislation or new implementation rules for audits or criminal codes. 
Evaluating a programme that covers the entire population of the country is quite difficult. 
In general, both experiments and quasi-experiments cannot be used since there is no scope 
for a control group. Two potential approaches could be considered to address this prob-
lem.   
• If the programme is to be rolled out in stages, the RCT method can be applied. Some 
groups can be assigned to receive treatment now, while the others receive it a later 
date. By rolling out the program in stages, ethical considerations of deliberately ex-
cluding some participants as controls are eliminated. Refer to Hoddinott / Skoufias 
(2004) and Schultz (2004) analyzing the impact of PROGRESA by capitalizing on the 
phased-in design of the program. 
• If the programme is of the full-coverage type, but treatment can be administered ran-
domly in varying intensity, its impact can be measured at the different levels of treat-
ment.  
• If the programme is to be rolled out all at once and the treatment is to be administered 
uniformly, a time-series analysis consisting of repeated measures taken periodically 
before and after the intervention could be used (Rossi and Freeman 1993). For exam-
ple, a new reform agenda has been implemented nationwide. Time-series analysis en-
tails predicting the post-intervention outcome using the pre-intervention trend. The 
trend of the predicted outcome becomes the counterfactual, i. e. what would have 
happened without the reform. The impact of the reform is the comparison between the 
predicted outcome and the actual post-intervention outcome. The drawback of this 
approach is that pre-intervention observations must be large enough to produce a ro-
bust prediction. Secondly, any treatment effects may not be fully credible owing to 
the bias resulting from various factors not taken into account. Apart from external fac-
tors, another problem is the presence of implementation lags, “announcement effects” 
and uncertainty as to when the programme actually took effect. This makes it difficult 
to pin down the exact timing of the programme. Fortunately, such structural breaks in 
the outcome can be formally tested (Piehl et al. 1999).  
7 Practical implications 
The discussion of the application of rigorous impact evaluation and of the challenges en-
countered in its conduct has implications for the design and implementation of governance 
interventions. Results of impact evaluations offer reliable knowledge and are important for 
evidence-based policymaking. The critical question is, then, “How can governance pro-
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grammes be designed that rigorous impact evaluation becomes possible?” The studies 
and examples that have been highlighted in this paper call for the discussion of various 
aspects:  
Include evaluator at the outset. The presence of an evaluator in the early phases of pro-
gramme design can significantly increase the potential of conducting RIE. Evaluations of 
new programmes call for the evaluator to be involved in all aspects of the programme – 
including observations on changes in interventions and potential outcomes. This makes it 
easier to identify components of the programme that can be evaluated quantitatively. Pro-
grammes are more difficult to evaluate when they are being run or have been completed, 
since the evaluator’s assessment is limited to project reports and interviews with donor 
staff. In addition, the initial indicators and data collected may no longer be appropriate at 
the time of evaluation. More importantly, the evaluator’s knowledge and hands-on exper-
tise regarding the dynamics of the intervention and the characteristics of the target popula-
tion may be limited if the evaluation is conducted under severe time constraints. For 
practitioners, this means obtaining advice from technically skilled evaluators right from 
the start of the programme. 
However, including evaluators at the outset is easier said than done. In most cases, evalua-
tors are consultants hired externally by donor agencies, and keeping them on for the entire 
duration of the programme is not economical. An alternative approach is to include the 
evaluator as a member of an advisory committee before project implementation so that 
appropriate outcome measurements and data collected have a better chance of remaining 
valid for the evaluation design. For instance, the World Bank’s Development Impact 
Evaluation (DIME) Initiative provides support teams of experts and research groups to 
help government counterparts to design and carry out impact evaluations.    
Randomise whenever possible. One of the most equitable ways of allocating the inter-
vention is through randomisation. Some programmes have held lotteries to select pro-
gramme beneficiaries. In some cases, this may not be suitable, especially if policymakers 
are interested only in the outcome for certain groups. Critics even say that it is “unethical,” 
since benefits are deliberately withheld from those in greatest need. Nevertheless, if inter-
ventions are assigned randomly and if done properly, it is the simplest way of evaluating a 
programme. This line of thinking also has its drawbacks, as Moehler (2010) notes. The 
popularity of RCTs should not prevent other quasi-experimental designs from being 
adopted. Impact evaluation means that the evaluator uses the best possible method (not 
only RCT), given all the information available to him and all the constraints he faces. 
Collect good-quality baseline data. There is a difference between collecting baseline 
data and quality baseline data. Quality baseline data come from careful planning of the 
programme. The data are collected from the relevant beneficiaries of specific interventions 
as well as from stakeholders. The data should include both initial characteristics of the 
target groups and expected outcomes. This is typically difficult to plan ex ante as some 
indirect outcomes are revealed only during or after implementation.  
Collect data on the control groups. Funding the intervention does not necessarily in-
clude funding for the collection of control group data. There are cases where funding for 
control group surveys is not included in the programme. As discussed in the previous 
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chapters, since the control group is a very important source of information in impact 
evaluation, it is important to provide a budget for its conduct  
Operationally, forming control groups is always tricky and difficult in practice. The first 
difficulty lies in identifying the appropriate control group. Second, once identified, there 
may be instances in which households or individuals have to be offered incentives to par-
ticipate in the survey. For instance, to determine the employment probabilities of gradu-
ates in schools with and without intervention, a graduate tracer study must be conducted 
on both. A graduate tracer study requires graduates to be identified, contacted and inter-
viewed so that relevant information can be collected. Schools that are not beneficiaries of 
the programme (but knew about it) may be reluctant to participate in the survey, especially 
if they are required to make an additional effort – in terms of time and personnel – to con-
tact their graduates and to convince them to participate. In this case, a letter from a gov-
ernment department (Ministry of Education) endorsing the survey should result in the 
control schools becoming more cooperative. There are many ways to circumvent this 
problem, mostly relying on the evaluator’s creativity. 
Cooperate with the relevant government agencies. The involvement of government 
agencies in development programmes varies widely. Regardless of the depth of its in-
volvement, the cooperation of the relevant agency must be obtained. The relevant gov-
ernment agencies are often important sources of information on the nature of the target 
beneficiaries. Being the local experts, they can help identify the likelihood of programme 
take-up.  
Government agencies also have institutional information on such matters as the presence 
of other donors in the area and their respective interventions. Such information could be 
useful in preventing bias and contamination issues. In the schooling example above, the 
cooperation of a government body could help support the evaluation to ensure its success-
ful completion. Although it may not be necessary, the agency’s confirmation also helps to 
lend credibility to the overall result of the evaluation.     
Identify components of the programme that permit RIE. At the outset, it is important 
to identify potential components of the programme to which quantitative analysis can be 
applied. Early identification means that the best possible method can be used for the 
evaluation and that the required data can already be gathered.  
For some donors and governments, the question whether or not to conduct rigorous impact 
evaluation is still open. In analyzing the impact of a high profile experimental intervention 
in African countries called Millennium Villages, Clemens / Demombynes (2010) enumer-
ated the reasons when to consider impact evaluation a “necessity” than a “luxury”: first, if 
the cost of conducting a rigorous evaluation is relatively low; second, if evaluation results 
can be produced before a policy decision needs to be made; third, if implementing the 
wrong policy can be disastrous; fourth, when it is impossible for all intended recipients to 
receive treatment due to constraints (meaning that there would be room for control group); 
fifth, there are strong interests from policymakers; and finally, there is reason to believe 
that the pilot test area is as similar as the scaled up intervention (external validity possi-
ble).  
There are, of course, interventions where RIE and the methods described earlier may be 
difficult (even impossible) to use. Consider development interventions, like for instance 
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general budget support, where treatment is typically a mixture of financial and non-
financial inputs provided at various levels of government. How can the changes in welfare 
be attributed to budget support? It may be possible to design certain aspects of budget 
support ex ante to permit appropriate attribution. Whether this is possible or not, further 
research is clearly needed to answer these questions.  
8 Summary and conclusions 
Governance is at the heart of the aid effectiveness debate. This debate stems from various 
empirical studies claiming that aid works only if recipient countries have the appropriate 
governance structures (Burnside / Dollar 2000; Collier / Dollar 2002; McGillivray et al. 
2006; World Bank 1998). Apart from being a prerequisite, governance is also regarded as 
an objective for aid. The popularity of such new aid modalities as general budget support 
highlights these two governance functions. While it seeks to strengthen state institutions 
and public financial management, it also ensures that a minimum level of governance 
structure has already been committed to minimise fiduciary risk and corruption. 
Although billions of dollars have been invested in governance programmes, sound evi-
dence of their impact is still very scarce. This is not to say that good outcomes have not 
been achieved, but rather that verifying those outcomes is difficult. This paper has there-
fore discussed the various quantitative methods of governance evaluation and given genu-
ine examples from the field. The scope of the paper covers experimental and quasi-
experimental designs in which governance acts: (i) as an intervention aimed at achieving 
certain development outcomes, (ii) as an outcome of an intervention or (iii) as an interven-
tion and outcome. The paper has presented evidence that certain aspects of governance 
programmes are suitable for rigorous impact evaluation. Of the four broad dimensions of 
governance, randomised control trials have proved popular in evaluating the programmes 
related to political systems and social governance, with specific reference to elections and 
community development (Moehler 2010). As this paper shows, difference-in-differences 
and instrumental variables have been applied to public administration and political sys-
tems, particularly in the control of corruption (Reinikka / Svensson 2004), voter mobilisa-
tion (Arceneaux et al. 2006) and measures to combat crime (Levitt 1997; 2002). 
Propensity score matching has also been useful in assessing social governance topics, spe-
cifically citizen participation (Barabas 2004; Capuno / Garcia 2010). Lastly, the applica-
tion regression discontinuity design has been rather limited in this field but this paper 
presented examples on employment and government spending behaviour (Lemieux / 
Milligan 2008; Pettersson-Lidbom / Tyrefors 2007). The paper has explained each method 
with real-life examples and has found that rigorous impact evaluation of various govern-
ance dimensions is feasible.  
As a rule, numerous technical problems emerge when governance programmes are evalu-
ated. They include such evaluation issues as outcome measurement; small sample size; 
spillovers; a lack of baseline data; evaluation at higher levels of government; complex 
interventions; and full-coverage programmes. As impact evaluations addressing these 
problems in the governance context remain scarce, alternative approaches to solving these 
problems by borrowing from the experience of other sectors have been presented. As pre-
viously argued, these problems were not new in the evaluation literature. Such heavily 
evaluated sectors as education, labour and health have already tackled these challenges.  
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There are ways of designing governance programmes to enable rigorous impact analysis to 
be undertaken. As most examples show, it is important to include an evaluator at project 
inception, to randomise whenever possible, to collect baseline and control group data, to 
cooperate with relevant government agencies and to identify programme components at 
the outset.  
As regards further research, this paper suggests, firstly, a comprehensive scoping study of 
governance interventions that have been evaluated rigorously to identify evidence gaps 
which an evaluation might seek to close and, secondly, a systematic evaluation of a spe-
cific governance intervention to build on existing knowledge of “what works”, “what 
doesn’t” and “why”. A few isolated evaluations are not sufficient to deliver a strong mes-
sage on the usefulness of certain interventions. The effectiveness of interventions should 
therefore be tested under various conditions and in various settings. 
In sum, more needs to be done to broaden the application of rigorous impact evaluation of 
governance in the field. Many questions still remain, but addressing this gap is one step 
forward in convincing donors to continue supporting governance initiatives and demon-
strating to practitioners and policymakers that governance programmes can indeed be rig-
orously evaluated. 
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